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CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR CREATING A 
TOXIC ENVIRONMENT: MENS REA, 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL liABIliTY 
STANDARDS, AND THE NEUROTOXICITY 
HYPOTHESIS 
COLIN CRAWFORD* 
Recent research in brain biochemistry examining the likely neurological 
effects of exposure to toxic contaminants continues to demand legal consid-
eration. In this Article, Professor Crawford evaluates the possible conse-
quences of recent neurobiological studies-labeled "The Neurotoxicity Hy-
pothesis" by researchers-for lawyers and the legal system. After 
summarizing the research, Professor Crawford suggests that as this (or simi-
lar) neurobiological research gains increased scientific acceptance, it will be 
necessary to reduce dramatically the acceptable levels of these toxic elements 
that can be discharged into the environment. He then examines the implica-
tions of such a result for establishing criminal liability under federal envi-
ronmental statutes, focusing on the criminal liability provisions of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1990s, American politicians and bureaucrats en-
gaged in a sustained and self-congratulatory celebration of the de-
cline in the nation's violent crime rate. l New York's mayor, Rudolph 
Giuliani, proudly declared upon his 1997 re-election that, as a result 
*Associate Professor, ThomasJefferson School of Law, San Diego. 
An early version of this Article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law & So-
ciety Association held in Chicago, Illinois on May 27-30, 1999. Jessie Allen, Elizabeth Har-
ris, and other attendees at that presentation provided useful comments. The readings of 
Suzette Brooks, Eve Cary, Marjorie Cohn, Jerry Wallingford, and Ellen Waldman also 
helped, as did that of Dr. Joan Esnayra. Although some of them disagreed with aspects of 
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis and my take on its legal implications, their comments were 
uniformly helpful to me, and for that I am grateful. Joseph A. Tontodonato, Class of 2000, 
provided able research assistance. I am also grateful to Dean Kenneth Vandevelde and a 
Thomas Jefferson summer research grant for assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
1 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines "violent" crimes as one of four 
types: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. See Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, FBI 1998 Preliminary Annual Release, UNIFORM CRIME REp. (1999). 
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of his administration's anti-crime efforts, "[m]illions have been liber-
ated from the reality and fear of crime."2 Mayor Giuliani is not alone 
in taking credit for the much ballyhooed reduction in the United 
States's violent crime rates.3 Yet it is worth remembering that more 
sober assessments of the decline in crime rates have been uncertain as 
to the exact causes.4 Furthermore, new research suggests that Mayor 
Giuliani and his compatriots around the country may not deserve 
much of the credit they are taking for the decline in violent crime 
rates. This research, labeled "the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis" by its 
progenitors,5 suggests that the long-term benefits of more stringent 
environmental laws and regulations (and specifically the passage of 
the lead control laws of the early 1970s),6 may have played a key role 
2 Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Second Inaugural Address at City Hall in New York City, 
New York (Jan. 1, 1998), available at <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/secondi 
naug.html>. 
3 For instance, in New York City alone, for the period 1993-97, officials reported that 
murders were down by 60.2%, armed robberies by 48.4%, and rapes by 13.5%. See Office of 
the Mayor of the City of New York, Press Release No. 006-97, available at <http:// 
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/98a/prOO6-98/html>. Throughout the 1990s, similar 
reductions have been registered across the country. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Homicides 
Decline Below 1964 Level in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at AI; John H. Cush-
man,Jr., Serious Crime Fell in U.S. For 6th Year in a Row in '97, N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1998, at 
A14; EdJahn, California'S Crime Rate Draps to 3O-year Low, SAN DIEGO UNION-TruB., June 16, 
1998, at B2; Eric Lichtblau, Crime Rates Continue Record 7-Year Plunge, L.A TIMES, May 17, 
1999, atAl; Frank Main, Murders are Down Again in Chicago, Qu. SUN-TIMEs,June 30, 1999, 
at 30 (reporting that the local murder rate is at a ten-year low); Major Crime Down in State 
Cities, LA DAILY NEWS, Feb. 24, 1999, at N3; Ruth L. McKinnie, Local Homicide Rates Con-
tinue to Drap, SAN DIEGO UNION-TruB., Mar. 29, 1998, at Bl; Miami Murder Rate Falls to a 20-
Year Low, AGENCE-FRANCE PREssE,Jan. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2525156. But see Bill 
Bryan, City Ranks No. 1 in Crime Per Capita, FBI Reports Police Chief Disputes Findings for '98: 
"Crime Has Been Going Down," ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 4, 1999, at Al (reporting 
that, adjusting for population, St. Louis had the highest rates of crime nationally); Graham 
Rayman, Troubling Public Safety Report, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1999, at A06 (noting increases in 
New York City homicide rates for the first half of 1999). 
4 See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Decline of Violent Crimes is Linked to Crack Market, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 28, 1998, at 5 (citing the likely importance of decline in crack cocaine sales); Fox 
Butterfield, Many Cities in U.S. Show Sharp Drap in Homicide Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, 
at 1; Clifford Krauss, Mystery of New York, the Suddenly Safer City, N.Y. TIMES,July 23,1995, 
§ 4, at 1; Neal R. Peirce, The Prison Craze and the Crime Rate, SAN DIEGO UNION-TruB., Jan. 5, 
1999, at B9 (identifying possible explanations for declines in crime rates). 
5 See infra Section I. 
6 The most prominent of these is the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (1999). Others include 15 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692 (1999) (setting forth 
various measures to effect lead exposure reduction) (original provisions enacted in 1976 
and amended in 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1999) (regulation of fuel additives) (basic statu-
tory provisions enacted in 1967); 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (1999) (lead-based housepaint). The 
manufacture of lead-based paint was prohibited in 1977 pursuant to a regulation promul-
gated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See 16 C.F.R. Pt. 1303 (West 2000). See 
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in the reductions in violent criminal behavior that have been regis-
tered in this decade. Research into the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis fur-
ther raises the possibility that the most trumpeted aspects of late 20th 
century criminal law enforcement-more beat cops, "three strikes" 
sentencing, and accelerated use of the death penalty-may not have 
the deterrent effects on criminal activity claimed by their advocates.7 
On the contrary, if conclusively established, the Neurotoxicity Hy-
pothesis will force reconsideration of the dominant causal explana-
tions for violent crime. 
Simply put, the hypothesis suggests that certain environmental 
stimulae should be viewed as significant co-factors that likely contribute 
to violent criminal behavior. The consequences of the hypothesis for 
regulation of criminal behavior are, however, anything but simple. 
Prevailing notions of criminology tend to rely upon social devel-
opment models that pay "a great deal of attention to social setting and 
social learning, with special attention to groups rather than individu-
als. "8 The Neurotoxicity Hypothesis complicates this picture consid-
erably, and in at least two respects. First, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis 
generally statutes cited infra note 29; Colin Crawford, 7Tends in the Regulation of Lead, 2 
ENvn.. L. N.Y. 145 (1991). 
7 See supra note 3; see also Ed Jahn, California Crime Rate Drops to 30-Year Low, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TruB., June 16, 1998, at B2 (crediting the "three-strikes law"); Rick Orlov & Phillip 
W. Browne, Valky Crime Plunges; Latest Statistics Reflect 6-Year Trend, LA DAILY NEWS, July 
15,1999, at Nl (quoting lAPD Commander Val Paniccia crediting the "three strikes" law 
and aggressive community policing for driving down crime); VmcentJ. Schodolski, Experts 
split Over Effect of "3 Strikes" Laws on Crime, CHI. TruB., Mar. 3, 1999, at 7 (reporting that 
statistics reflect a crime decrease and prison population increase in the twenty-four states 
that have adopted "three strikes" or other similar laws); John Strauss, Democrats, Peterson 
Ready to Make Run, Mayoral Candidate Wins Party Suppurt and Calls fw Collaborative Campaign-
ing, INDIANAPOUS STAR, Feb. 18,1999, at COl (reporting that Mayor Stephen Goldsmith 
noted an overall decrease in crime in Indianapolis as a result of more funding for the p0-
lice); Sue Weibezahl & Erik Kriss, Some Sad, Some Pleased Uy "Death;" opponents Say Penalty 
Wrong, POST-STANDARD, Aug. 21, 1999, at A3 (quoting New York State Senator Dale Volker 
attributing drop in murder and crime rates to New York's capital punishment law). But see 
Mike Kataoka, "Three Strikes" Law Not Working, Study Says But Prosecutors Dispute Institute's 
Findings, PREss ENTERPIUSE, Mar. 3, 1999, at A03 (evaluating the Justice Policy Institute's 
findings and theorizing that an improved economy and the leveling off of the crack co-
caine trade are reasons for the crime reduction); Scot Leigh & Frank Phillips, Views ofCef,. 
lucci, Professw Characterize Death PenalJy Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1999, at B4 (stating 
that there is little public clamor for a capital punishment law because the crime rate of 
Massachusetts is down so significantly). 
8 C. Ray Jeffery, Criminology and Criminal Law: Science Ver.sus Policy and the Interaction of 
Science and Law, in ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 3, 8 (1999) [hereinafter Crimi-
nology and Criminal Law]. See also C. Ray Jeffery, The Prevention of Juvenile Violence 3 (pa-
per presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Mar. 13, 
1998) (unpublished paper, on file with author). 
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will require expanding the field of analysis. That is, although the hy-
pothesis does not discount the importance of social setting and social 
learning, it does demand that the field of inquiry be broadened con-
siderably, so that students of criminal behavior consider not merely 
social stimulae-such as poverty, poor nutrition, and unhealthy living 
conditions--but also neurological functions. Furthermore, integrat-
ing biochemical information into assessments of criminal behavior 
will require distinguishing between individuals rather than just look-
ing at criminals as a group. It will also require lawyers to draw upon 
not merely sociological data, but also to learn from biology and neu-
rochemistry. 
This Article will identify areas of concern for lawyers and judges 
in light of the Neuroto:x;icity Hypothesis. It proceeds on the assump-
tion that ongoing neuroscience research demands lawyers' attention. 
As data supporting the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis continues to accu-
mulate and gain wider acceptance, this research seems likely to affect 
the future content and administration not only of U.S. criminal law, 
but also of U.S. environmental law. Those better situated to do so 
have already begun to limn the outlines of an affirmative criminal de-
fense in light of neurotoxic contamination.9 In what follows, my aim-
as an environmental lawyer-is somewhat different. I offer a prelimi-
nary exploration of the consequences of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis 
for U.S. environmental law. 10 The Article is divided into three main 
9 See Deborah W. Denno, Considering Lead Poisoning as a Criminal Defense, 20 FORDHAM 
Un. LJ. 377, 385 (1993) (stating that "[e]ven in a racially and environmentally homoge-
neous sample of children, environmental factors predominated in predicting who would 
be a criminal"). ' 
10 In related contexts, lawyers have begun to take note of the importance of biological 
knowledge to the law. See generally DEBORAH W. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE: FROM 
BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD (1990) (reporting and analyzing the results of "the Biosocial Proj-
ect, " a study of 1000 individuals in Philadelphia from birth to young adulthood); Deborah 
W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. Cam. L. & CluMINOLOGY 80 
(1994); DeborahJ. [sic] Denno, Neuropsychological and Early Environmental Correlates of Sex 
Differences in Crime, 23 INT'LJ. NEUROSCIENCE 199 (1984); Deborah W. Denno, Sociological 
and Human Developmental Explanations of Crime: Conflict or Consensus 7, 23 CluMINOLOGY 711 
(1985); E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 595 
(1997); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in the Law: An Introduction and Application to 
Child Alluse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117 (1997) (positing the value of biological approaches to 
legal analysis); Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology: Thward an Integrated Model of Human Behav-
ior, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 167 (1997) (arguing for more cross-disciplinary fertiliza-
tion to develop a model of human behavior not rooted in traditional social science mod-
els); Owen D.Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827 (1999); Vicki 
Quade, Hair May Hold the Secret, 69 A.BA.J. 1814 (1983) (reporting chemical imbalances 
as a possible cause of violent behavior). 
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parts. Part I will more fully describe the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis and 
related research in brain biochemistry. Part I will also emphasize as-
pects of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis likely to prove relevant for U.S. 
law, focusing in particular on mens rea and standards of liability. 
Part II is the heart of the Article and, as such, it merits discussion 
in outline form here. The law need not only consider the mens rea of 
individuals who commit violent crimes due to neurotoxicity, but also 
of those who create the toxic conditions that result in neurotoxicity. 
As a result, Part II concentrates on the criminal enforcement features 
of federal environmental statutes as they relate to the evidence in 
support of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. Part II will identify those 
respects in which the criminal provisions in federal environmental 
laws are ill-equipped to respond to the increasingly convincing evi-
dence presented by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. This is especially 
true given continuing concern in the courts and among legal com-
mentators that the standards used to enforce federal environmental 
laws, especially criminal provisions, are ambiguous. Part II argues that 
this is largely because courts and commentators continue to differ 
about the proper standard of liability for regulatory crimes.ll 
Part II further suggests that unless the liability standards in the 
major federal environmental law statutes are reconsidered in light of 
this neurotoxicity research, the credibility and widespread acceptance 
of criminal enforcement of U.S. environmental laws could be seri-
ously compromised)2 Neurotoxicity research will, once further con-
firmed, almost certainly compel the relevant environmental regula-
tory authority to lower, perhaps significantly, the acceptable levels of 
toxic metals able to be discharged into the environment. Presumably, 
11 See i1ifTa Section IIA.l.b. 
12 The legal arguments outlined in Sections II and III, infra, do not rest solely upon 
the ultimate credence given what has been labeled "the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis." On the 
contrary, the argument advanced in this Article is animated by the belief that if not this 
research, then other neurobiological and/or neurochemical research will force attention 
to the issues considered here. Samples of scientific and social scientific research that prom-
ise to demand legal consideration in coming years include, generally, MARGARET GRUTER, 
LAw AND THE MIND: BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1991); LAw, BIOLOGY & 
CULTURE (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannan eds., 1983); THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIO-
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAw (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); SARNOFF 
A MEDNICK ET AL., THE CAUSES OF CRIME: NEW BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES (1997); ADRIAN 
RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME (1993); Michael T. McGuire, Biochemical Screen-
ingtoPredictBehavior, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 565 (1991). 
For more popular reports on this research, see Pesticides and Aggression, RACHEL'S 
ENV'T AND HEALTH WEEKLY No. 64,8 (Apr. 29, 1999); Wray Herbert, Politics of Biology: How 
the Nature Vs. Nurture Debate Shapes Public Policy-and Our View of Ourselves, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REp., Apr. 21,1997, available in 1997WL 8331924. 
346 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:341 
therefore, ever larger numbers of individuals could become directly 
subject to possible criminal liability for violation of those statutes. In-
asmuch as courts have widely divergent readings of the proper inter-
pretation of the liability provisions of those statutes, wildly inconsis-
tent results are not only possible but likely. Such a result would 
severely compromise the integrity of and erode confidence in the en-
vironmental enforcement arm of the legal system. 
Part II briefly concludes by considering the implications of the 
Neurotoxicity Hypothesis for civil liability under federal environ-
mental standards, and indicates the relevance of the interpretation of 
civil standards for criminal environmental liability. Part III looks to 
solutions, and will briefly outline ways in which U.S. laws-in particu-
lar federal criminal environmental laws-might be reformulated to 
take account of the research undertaken in light of the Neurotoxicity 
Hypothesis. 
I. THE NEUROTOXICITY HYPOTHESIS 
A. Introduction 
On its face, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is elegant in its simplic-
ity. The Neurotoxicity Hypothesis holds that biochemical imbalances 
in heavy metals and other elemental toxins may contribute 
significantly to anti-social behavior by disrupting the normal function-
ing of a person's brain biochemistry. In particular, research on the 
Neurotoxicity Hypothesis has focused on uptake of lead, manganese, 
cadmium and certain fluoride compounds. III At the outset, however, it 
is crucial to understand that the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is anything 
13 See, e.g., Roger D. Masters et aI., Brain Biochemistry and Social Status: The Neurotoxicity 
Hypothesis, in INTEl.LIGENCE, POLITICAL INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 141 (1997) [here-
inafter Brain Biochemistry]; Roger D. Masters et aI., Brain Biochemistry and the Violence Epi-
demic: Toward a "Win-Win" Strategy for Reducing Crime, in SUPER-OPTIMIZING EXAMPLES 
ACROSS PuBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS (Stuart Nagel ed., forthcoming); Roger D. Masters et aI., 
Environmental Pollution, Neurotoxicity and Criminal Violence, in ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY: 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 13 (1998) (reviewing evidence linking lead and manganese neu-
rotoxicity to aggressive behavior and crime for ail 3141 U.S. counties); THE NEUROTRANS-
MITTER REVOLUTION: SEROTONIN, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAw (Roger D. Masters & 
Michael T. McGuire eds., 1993) [hereinafter THE NEUROTRANSMITTER REVOLUTION]; 
Roger D. Masters, Environmental Pollution and Crime, 22 VT. L. REv. 359, 375 (1997) (argu-
ing, inter alia, that "[b]oth crime prevention and effective sentencing need to consider a 
broader range of risk factors than has hitherto been customary."); Roger D. Masters & 
Myron Coplan, Water Treatment with Silicofluorides and Lead Toxicity, in INT'L J. OF ENVTL. 
STUDIES (forthcoming 1999) (linking silicofluoride treatment of public water supplies with 
increased childhood lead uptake in Massachusetts towns) . 
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but reductive. That is, it does not contend that exposure to heavy 
metals single-handedly creates criminals. On the contrary, the hypothe-
sis focuses on individual brain biochemistry, as influenced by both 
individual genetic makeup and environmental exposure, as well as 
other social conditions.14 Consequently, a key aspect of the Neurotox-
icity Hypothesis is the recognition that factors such as diet, alcohol, 
and drug use play a role in permitting the speedier absorption of 
heavy metals into an individual's system.15 In short, advocates of the 
hypothesis stress that neurotoxicity should not be understood as the 
determining variable for predicting violent behavior. Instead, they 
make it clear that neurotoxicity is just one among many causes, "at 
most functioning as a catalyst which, in addition to poverty, social 
stress, alcohol or drug abuse, individual character, and other social 
factors, increases the likelihood that an individual will commit a vio-
lent crime. "16 
B. Measuring Neurotoxicity 
It is not the place of this Article to defend the science that un-
dergirds the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, but it is necessary to explain 
the basic premises underlying the hypothesis. Specifically, the Neuro-
toxicity Hypothesis looks at two kinds of environmental toxicity: direct 
and indirect. Direct toxicity refers to demonstrable exposure to a 
toxic element, with detectable (and undesirable) consequences. An 
example of direct toxicity would be childhood lead poisoning as a 
consequence of ingesting lead paint, with resulting abnormal brain 
development,17 By contrast, indirect-or subclinical-toxicity looks, 
for instance, at "[ c] hanges in brain biochemistry that are not at first 
obviously associated with environmental pollution [but] can have 
significant effects on behavior. "18 Thus, for example, exposure to sub-
clinical levels of certain toxic elements might disrupt normal neuro-
transmitter function. 19 The neurotransmitters serotonin and dopa-
14 See Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 154. 
15 See id. at 156. 
16 Masters et al., Environmental Pollution, Neurotoxicity and Criminal Violence, supra note 
13, at 18. 
17 See Masters et a!., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 154. 
18 Id. at 155. 
19 "Neurotransmitters may be defined as chemical messengers, which allow the trans-
fer of information between neurons .... The neurotransmitters are of different types of 
molecules, including amino acids, neuropeptides, and the biogenic amines." Dan J. Stein 
& Michael Stanley, Serotonin and Suicide, in THE NEUROTRANSMITTER REVOLUTION, supra 
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mine are essential to "impulse control and planning. "20 Evidence sug-
gests that neurotoxic metals (notably manganese) can lower levels of 
these key neurotransmitters,21 thereby making it possible for an indi-
vidual's neurotoxic exposure to result in violent activity. 
The hypothesis concludes "that ecological factors such as envi-
ronmental pollution have effects that appear to be genetic (and, in-
deed, may be associated with a genetically based vulnerability to toxic-
ity that is quite distinct from a gene for intelligence). "22 This might 
mean, for example, that twin children exposed to the same levels of 
environmental toxins from birth might be differently affected by that 
exposure, depending on their individual genetic makeup.23 This as-
pect of the hypothesis has raised concern regarding its potential use 
to support eugenic ends. Critics of this sort of research might con-
tend, for example, that identification of a "gene" for toxicity vulner-
ability could be used to justify discrimination against such persons (or 
worse) if it was also shown that individuals with that vulnerability were 
more likely than others to commit violent crimes.24 This criticism is of 
note 13. See also Arthur litwiler et al., The Basics of Serotonin Neurochmnistry, in THE NEURO-
TRANSMITTER REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 37-46. 
20 Masters et al., Brain Biochmnistry, supra note 13, at 154. 
21 See id. at 153-54. 
22 Id. at 152. 
2S This is the thrust of some of the unpublished work of William Walsh, of the Health 
Research Institute of Napierville, Illinois. Walsh conducted a study of twenty-four pairs of 
twins where one twin was either not violent or less violent than an extremely violent twin. 
The study revealed that the more violent twin had abnormal levels of trace heavy metals. 
Telephone Interview with William Walsh, Ph.D., Health Research Institute (June 1, 1998). 
Walsh's Institute is dedicated to correcting behavioral disorders through biochemical 
means. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Walsh et al., Elevated Blood Copper/Zinc Ratios in Assaultive Young 
Males, 62 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 327 (1997); WilliamJ. Walsh, Biochemical Treatment 
and Behavior Outcomes (Aug. 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Wil-
liamJ. Walsh, Biochemical Treatment of Mental Illness and Behavior Disorders, Address at 
the Minnesota Brain Bio Association (Nov. 17, 1997); William J. Walsh et al., Biochemical 
Treatment of Behavior Disorders (May 9,1996) (unpublished materials presented at the 
149th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, New York, New York, on 
file with author); WilliamJ. Walsh, Zinc Deficiency, Metal Metabolism, and Behavior Dis-
orders (Sept. 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also H. Ron Isaacson 
et al., Autism: A Retrospective Outcome Study of Nutrient Therapy, 48 J. OF APPLIED NUTRITION 
No.4 (1996) (describing the use of nutrient therapy to treat behavioral and learning dis-
orders, depression, schizophrenia, and autism); Nutrition: A Deficiency Made Me Do It, 30 
PSYCHOL. TODAY 14,14 (Nov./Dec. 1997). 
24 See Sheldon M. Novick, Racial Images of the "Criminal": A Cognitive Disorder, 22 VT. L. 
REv. 383 (1997) (questioning the underlying assumptions and implications of the work of, 
inter alia, Deborah Denno and Roger Masters); Joan Vogel, Biological Theories of Human 
Behavior: Admonitions of a Skeptic, 22 VT. L. REv. 425, 425 n.l (1997) (citing extensive litera-
ture on "the uses and misuses of biological theories"). But see DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIO-
LENCE, supra note 10, at 1-2 (noting the concern that biological explanations of behavior 
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special concern in light of neurotoxicity research suggesting that 
some racial and ethnic groups may, because of their diet and racially-
linked characteristics, be more vulnerable than others to environ-
mental toxins.25 The response of neurotoxicity researchers is that 
these differences highlight the need to act in light of evidence of neu-
rotoxic contamination.26 Nonetheless, the concern that this will lead 
to profiling of particular social groups-and above all racial 
profiling-is sure to remain a flashpoint as the relevance of this re-
search continues to be debated.27 
will fuel prejudices, but emphasizing that such criticisms are reductive); but see generally 
Roger D. Masters, Is Sociobiology Reactionary? The Political Implications of Inclusive-Fitness The-
ory, 57 Q. REv. BIOLOGY 275 (1982) (concluding that biological explanations are not nec-
essarily ideological in content). For a survey of some recent literature considering the 
kinds of racial disparities discussed by Novick, see Nicholas Lemann, Justice for Blacks?, N.Y. 
REv. BOOKS 25 (Mar. 5, 1998). 
The typical concern raised in this context is that neurotoxicity research could be used 
to manage populations in pernicious ways, as in the infamous case of Buck u Bell. involving 
Carrie Buck, a "feeble-minded white woman, ~ whose mother and child were also "feeble-
minded.~ See 274 U.S. 200,205 (1927). The State of Virginia sought to sterilize Buck under 
a state statute. See id. Justice Holmes, declaring that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough, ~ agreed with the State, and offered the following, chilling words in support of his 
view: 
[w]e have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to 
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with in-
competence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute de-
generate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. 
Id. at 207. 
For a general overview of the social implications of new work in genetics, see gener-
ally TRoy DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (1990). See also generally JARED DIAMOND, 
GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1997). Among other things, 
Diamond looks at the way historical incidents have affected the development of different 
races and geographic regions. As such, Diamond's argument could be viewed as an en-
dorsement of research like that on the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis to anticipate harms by 
using the most recent advances in human knowledge. See generally id. 
25 Masters, for example, notes that "all individuals are not equally vulnerable to eco-
logical pathways of toxins. ~ Masters et al., Environmental Pollution, Neurotoxicity and Criminal 
Violence, supra note 13, at 31. He goes on to explain that the poor in the United States of-
ten suffer from dietary deficiencies, including vitamin D and calcium deficiencies. See id. 
He explains that these deficiencies are made worse when an individual also suffers from 
manganese exposure, because calcium can help reduce uptake of neurotoxic metals. See id. 
26 See Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 150-54. 
27 On the concern with racial profiling as a result of this research, see, for example, 
Novick, supra note 24, at 390 (arguing that even the focus on "violent crime~ is a social 
construction borne of inherently prejudicial racial stereotypes). 
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Assuming that the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis correctly identifies a 
contributing factor to criminal behavior, it begs the question of solu-
tions. In this respect, advocates of the hypothesis stress that potential 
solutions are relatively simple and inexpensive compared to the costs 
of other forms of criminal enforcement, such as incarceration. Neuro-
toxicity researchers conclude, for example, that health and nutrition 
are key in preventing violent, anti-social behavior. For instance, 
"[d]ietary deficiencies, especially in calcium and other basic vitamins 
and minerals, can be overcome," possibly correcting the anti-social 
behavior caused by exposure to toxic elements.28 
"To be plausible, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis requires the 
identification of precise biochemical mechanisms underlying correla-
tions between individual concentrations of toxic metals and violent 
behavior. "29 To date, neurotoxicity research has focused on the dan-
gers presented by four toxic heavy metals in particular. Before explor-
ing the legal implications of the hypothesis, it is useful to review the 
elemental toxins on which this research has concentrated.30 
1. Lead 
The knowledge of the toxicity of elemental lead is ancient and 
well-documented.31 Despite the fact that lead reduction must be rec-
ognized as one of this country's greatest environmental regulatory 
successes,32 the presence of lead in water (from deteriorating plumb-
ing), urban soil, and the wall paint of aging housing stock has not dis-
appeared.33 Much of the research on lead poisoning, however, has 
28 Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 156 (noting that "[a]lthough some 
researchers argue that the behavioral consequences of toxic elements are reversible v.ith 
individualized vitamin treatments, others have been critical of the research to 
date."( citations omitted». 
29 Id. (citations omitted). 
5OSeeid. 
51 "Concern over the effect of lead on infant and child development is, of course, of 
long standing. Noted in antiquity by Hippocrates and two centuries ago by Benjamin 
Franklin, the danger of lead poisoning has been the subject of widespread scientific analy-
sis." Id. at 157. 
52 See, e.g., Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4826 (1999); 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (1999). 
55 See Lead Exposure Reduction Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692 (1999); Residential Lead-
Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act of 1992,42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 (1999); Lead Con-
tamination Control Act of 1988,42 U.S.C. §§ 24Th-I, 300j-21-300j-26 (1999); see gmerally 
Committee on Environmental Hazards, Statement on Childhood Lead Poisoning, 79 JAMA 457 
(Mar. 1987). The dangers of lead continue to merit study and regulation. See, e.g., Man-
agement and Disposal of Lead-based Paint Debris, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,190 (Dec. 18, 1998) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 745); Notice of the Revised Primty List of Hazardous Substances That 
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focused on its adverse effects on the entire body-particularly on 
nervous system damageM-and not on brain lead levels in particular. 
Even at so-called subclinical levels, neurotoxicity research suggests, 
lead can have serious adverse consequences as a cause of violent be-
havior.35 Of particular seriousness is the fact that infants and children 
absorb lead at much higher levels than do adults, causing "neuronal 
damage during early development, resulting in lasting cognitive and 
behavioral deficits associated with prolonged exposure to even very 
low doses."36 Moreover, "[t]he highest levels of lead uptake are re-
ported for males and blacks-i.e. those who are most likely to commit 
violent crimes. "57 
WiU be the Subject of Toxicological Profiles, 63 Fed. Reg. 61,332 (Nov. 17, 1997) ("This an-
nouncement provides notice that the agencies have developed and are making available a 
raised CERCLA Priority List of 275 Hazardous Substances, based on the most recent in-
formation available to ATSDR and EPA."). Among the top twenty-five substances listed on 
the 1997 Priority List of Hazardous Substances, lead placed second while cadmium placed 
seventh. See 63 Fed. Reg. 70,190. See also, Herbert L. Needleman M.D. et al., Bone Lead Lev-
els and Delinquent Behavior, 275 JAMA 363 (1996) (studying 850 boys ages seven to eleven 
and concluding that lead exposure increases the risk of antisocial and delinquent behav-
ior). But see Letter from Henrietta K. Sachs, M.D., to the Editor, Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 275 JAMA 1725 Oune 12, 1996) (challenging Dr. Needleman's results); 
Steve La Rue, Lead Poisoning Continues to Pwgue Kids, SAN DIEGO UNION-nuB., July 18, 
1999, at Bl (noting continuing exposure to lead in various forms, including, inter alia, 
house paint, particularly among Hispanic- and African-Americans); Andrea Mandel-
Campbell, Mexico spotlight on Lead-Producing Companies, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1999, at 4; 
John O'Neil, Study Finds Lead Poisoning is Tied to Children ~ Tooth Decay, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 
1999, atAl4. 
S4 See Committee on Environmental Hazards, supra note 33, at 459 (noting that 
"[n]europsychologic dysfunction, characterized by reduction in intelligence and alteration 
in behavior, has been shown conclusively to occur in asymptomatic children with elevated 
blood lead levels. j. The report also noted that because of increased concerns in 1987 
about the seriousness of excessive blood lead contamination, an Advisory Committee to 
the Centers for Disease Control determined that the level for excessive blood lead should 
be reduced by nearly twenty percent. See id. 
55 See grmerally Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 153 ("It has long been 
known that serious behavioral and cognitive deficits are caused by exposure to lead, espe-
cially during infancy and childhood. Subclinical lead poisoning has been correlated with 
learning disabilities, Attention Deficit Disorder, and other psychological abnormalities 
sometimes associated with deviant behavior. j; Stein Be Stanley, Serotonin and Suicide, supra 
note 19; \Uwi.ler et al., The Basics of Serotonin Neurochemistry, supra note 19. 
56 Masters et al., Bmin Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 157. 
s7Id. (citing Debra Brody et al., Blood Lead Levels in the U.S. Popuwtion, 272JAMA 277-
83 (1994); DerikBryce-Smith, Lead Induced Disorder of Mentation in Children, 1 NUTRITION Be 
HEALTIl179-94 (1983); Howard W. Mielke, Lead Dust-Contaminated Communities and Minor-
ity Health: A New Paradigm, in THE NATIONAL MINORITY lh:ALTII CoNFERENCE (1992». It 
might have been more appropriate for Professor Masters and his co-authors to say that 
young black men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five are more likely to be "ar-
rested" for criminal activities than to "commit" them. Many argue that certain demo-
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2. Manganese 
Manganese, the metal alloyed with steel to give it toughness and 
durability, can "produce highly complex toxic effects" such as lower-
ing the brain levels of neurotransmitters essential to behavior control, 
such as serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine.38 Because "ab-
normal levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin are associated with 
mood disturbances, poor impulse control, and increases in aggressive 
behavior ... it has been hypothesized that manganese uptake in the 
brain lowers the levels or activity of dopamine and serotonin, leading 
to loss of impulse control, violence, and even heart disease. "39 
3. Other Neurotoxic Metals 
Insofar as scientists have documented the possibility that heavy 
metals like lead and manganese may disturb brain function, it seems 
likely that "hitherto unsuspected toxins may act in addition to or in 
combination with lead and manganese."4O Of special concern are 
elements that may be associated with violent behavior, notably chro-
mium, cadmium, and sodium.41 Neurotoxicity research has not yet 
focused on the possible contributions of these elements to violent be-
graphic groups, particularly young African-American men, commit more crimes per capita 
or are more likely to be arrested because of their skin color. For example, one criminal 
justice reform group has documented the fact that nearly one in three African-American 
males between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine is, on any given day, in prison or jail, or 
on probation or parole. The report questions whether that high percentage truly reflects a 
need to punish instead of a practice of targeting specific groups. See generally The Sentenc-
ing Project, Report Summary, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS & THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
FIvE YEARS LATER (1995). Of course, if some demographic groups are arrested dispropor-
tionately as compared to those who actually commit crimes, it would be necessary for neu-
rotoxicity research to take account of that fact, in part for some of the critical judgments 
leveled against neurotoxicity research by Novick. See generally Novick, supra note 24. 
lIS See Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 158. 
39 Id. As noted above, an especially important feature of neurotoxicity research is the 
contention that contamination from heavy metals can only be understood in connection 
with other empirical data. For instance, bottle-fed infants and those with diets low in cal-
cium and essential vitamins appear to be "especially susceptible" to manganese uptake. 
Notably, African-American and Latino-American infants are more likely than other infants 
to be bottle-fed. What is more, the black and Latino poor appear to consume far less cal-
cium and Vitamin D, which plays a central function in calcium uptake, than do whites. For 
example, African-American teenage males consume on average about two-thirds of the 
calcium of their white counterparts. See id. at 165. Once again, then, the Neurotoxicity 
Hypothesis points to the conclusion that certain demographic groups may, as a result of 
genetic predisposition, exposure to toxic heavy metals, and other factors like inadequate 
nutrition, be more likely to commit violent criminal acts. 
40 Id. at 159. 
41 See id. 
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havior. However, neurotoxicity researchers have noted that the likely 
role of these elements needs to be pursued, especially in light of the 
strong correlations between lead and manganese and violent behav-
ior.42 
4. Other Potentially Toxic Elements 
Recent neurotoxicity research points to an important "interven-
ing variable" in lead uptake, namely chemical fluoridation agents.43 
Specifically, "[e]levated levels oflead in water supplies are associated 
principally with systems that introduced the use of [the fluoridation 
agent] fluorosilicic acid after 1975, indicating that fluoridation pro-
cedures are probably a key factor" in lead uptake.44 Preliminary re-
search looked at 350 Massachusetts communities, some of which used 
a fluoridation agent and some of which did not. In those communities 
that treated water with fluorosilicic acid, the lead levels were nearly 
double those of un fluoridated communities.45 As the research notes, 
this suggests a hitherto unsuspected possible cause of lead neurotoxic-
ity.46 Once further established, this research will demand legal action. 
To the extent that the safety of water supplies are concerned, legal 
action will include amendment of environmental laws and regulatory 
standards.47 For purposes of this Article, this research need not be 
42 See generally Needleman et aI., supra note 33; Walsh et aI., ElRvated Blood Copper/Zinc 
Ratios in Assaultive Young Males, supra note 23; Walsh, Biochemical Treatment and Behavior 
Outcomes, supra note 23; Walsh, Biochemical Treatment of Mental Illness and Behavior 
Disorders, supra note 23; Walsh et aI., Biochemical Treatment of Behavior Disorders, supra 
note 23; Walsh, Zinc Deficiency, Metal Metabolism, and Behavior Disorders, supra note 23. 
43 See generally Roger D. Masters & Myron D. Coplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead 
Toxicity: The Role of Silicofluoridation Agents (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author); Roger D. Masters & Myron D. Coplan, The Triune Brain, the Environment, 
and Human Behavior: Homage to Paul MacLean (July 16,1999) (paper presented at Fest-
schrift in Honor of Paul MacLean, on file with author). 
44 Masters & Coplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead Toxicity, supra note 43; see Mas-
ters & Coplan, The Triune Brain, the Environment, and Human Behavior, supra note 43. 
45 See Masters & Coplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead Toxicity, supra note 43, at 6-
7. 
46 See id. at 10. 
47 For example, the recent decision of the City of Los Angeles to fluoridate its public 
water supplies might have to be reversed. See Patrick McGreevy, Contract Clears Way for 
Fluoridation, L.A TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at B7. The research on the neurotoxicity of 
silicofluorides has not yet documented possible correlations between those cities treating 
with the potentially harmful fluoridation agents, namely f1uorosilicic acid or sodium chlo-
ride, although the researchers did note "in [this] context that more than a dozen large 
crime cities have been treating their water with these agents for between 20 and 40 years." 
Masters & Coplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead Toxicity, supra note 43, at 10. 
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conclusively proven. Rather, it points to a rapidly evolving body of 
work that, as demonstrated in the remainder of this Article, will de-
mand legal attention. 
C. Related Concerns 
As stressed above, a key aspect of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is 
the multi-causal character of influences on violent behavior. Neuro-
toxicity researchers stress the interaction of several other factors along 
with toxic exposure. The most notable of these are "[d]ietary deficits 
in calcium, zinc, and essential vitamins or minerals [that] can result in 
greater absorption of lead, manganese, and other toxic metals from 
water supplies or food and uptake of such neurotoxic elements in 
brain cells."48 Of particular importance in this connection may be the 
comparative infrequency of breast feeding among the urban poor. 
Studies indicate that black children are three times less likely than 
white children to be breast rather than bottle fed.49 Moreover, "Na-
tional Nutritional Surveys show that black teenage males consume on 
average only two-thirds as much calcium as do whites; calcium intake 
among Hispanics was also below the white average. "50 Problems of 
calcium delivery are not limited only to teenagers, however. Hispanic 
and African-American infants are more likely to be bottle- than breast-
fed, and "[i]nfants bottle-fed with cows' milk formula absorb five 
times more manganese than those who are breast-fed. "51 In addition, 
infant formula is often mixed using water from pipes in aging water 
systems that "transmit lead and manganese, further increasing the 
risks. "52 Thus, black and Hispanic children may be more likely to suf-
fer neurotoxic poisoning-and therefore may be more inclined to 
commit violent crimes later in life-because their diets are compara-
tively low in calcium. 
For lawyers, this is important but complicating information. The 
information makes the lawyers' task more difficult because it requires 
environmental policies to be formed in the context of a broad appre-
ciation of public health and welfare strategies-that is, devising ways 
to combat potential environmental risks with comprehensive diet and 
health planning. Similarly, neurotoxicity research suggests that alco-
48 Masters et a1., Environmental Pollution, supra note 13, at 19-20. 
49 See Masters et a1., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 166. 
50 Id. at 164,166 (citations omitted). 
51Id. at 160. 
52Id. 
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hoI and drug use, both of which are "highly correlated with loss of 
impulse control and violence," may increase "the cellular uptake of 
cadmium, another of the toxic metals implicated in behavior dysfunc-
tion and violence. "53 Again, therefore, the optimal legal response 
would be one that coordinated environmental and public health pol-
icy, combatting toxic heavy metal exposure simultaneously with the 
implementation of strategies to reduce alcohol and drug consump-
tion. 
D. The Connection Between Neurotoxic Contamination and Crime 
To test the plausibility of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, Roger 
Masters, a Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth College, en-
gaged with his research assistants in an exhaustive comparison of fed-
eral data on the distribution of environmental pollutants and crime.54 
First, Masters used the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) for 1991.55 He focused particularly on 
lead and manganese exposure for all 3,141 U.S. counties. Masters 
then looked at Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime reports 
for those counties to measure the incidence of property and violent 
crimes against the TRI lead and manganese exposure data. 56 
Masters' findings are highly suggestive of a likely crime-
environmental contamination link. First, he noted that eighty percent 
of U.S. counties have no reported release of either compound.57 In 
55Id. at 159. 
54 See Masters et al., Environmental PoUution, supra note 13, at 15-16, 32. 
55 See id. at 16, 32. The TRI is produced annually by the EPA pursuant to Section 313 of 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, and Section 6607 of 
the Pollution Prevention Act ofl990. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11023, 13106 (1999). The 1997 TRI, 
the most recent, was published in April 1999. See Office of Pollution Prevention and 
Toxics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997 Toxies Release Inventqry Public Data 
Rekase Report, availabk at http://www.epa.gov/optintr/tri/tri97/drhome.html. 
56 See Masters et al., Environmental PoUution, supra note 13, at 16. The 242 counties re-
porting no incidence of violent or property crimes in that year were dropped from Mas-
ters's comparison. See id. at 32. 
One possible concern about the use of FBI data is that they may reflect, to a dispro-
portionate degree, a bias from large urban centers, which may contain relatively more 
efficient information-collection systems. Local crime reports may therefore present a more 
reliable statistical base, although they are not easily obtained and such data might be 
difficult to standardize. 
57 See id. It bears mentioning that Masters and his research colleagues also looked at 
levels of alcoholism as they may have related to violent crime. Suffice it to say that they also 
found a correlation between crime and alcoholism, a connection that is already a well-
established feature of the criminology literature. See Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra 
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those counties with no reported lead or manganese releases, "rates of 
violent crime are below average (216 per 100,000 compared to the 
national mean of 298)."58 Second, by contrast, "the 52 counties with 
toxic releases from both metals . . . have almost four times as much 
violent crime (920 per 100,000)."59 
Clearly, such powerful correlations demand attention. Yet from 
the perspective of many scientists, trained in the methods of con-
trolled clinical studies and multiple attempts to replicate the same 
results, such correlations are inherently suspect. The concern is that 
such correlations are subject to the "ecological fallacy," that is, the no-
tion that one should be wary of turning correlations into causes.60 
Proponents of the hypothesis do not discount the possible relevance 
of the ecological fallacy, but insist that it cannot be used as a means to 
forestall serious consideration of their data. Inevitably, they argue, it is 
simply impossible to control for every conceivable variable. It would 
be unethical (if not practically impossible) to have a control group 
that was exposed to toxic contamination in order to test the reliability 
of the findings.61 It is possible, however, to imagine forms of control 
to demonstrate that Masters' correlations are indeed causes.62 
To correct for the possible relevance of the ecological fallacy, 
proponents of the hypothesis argue, it is essential constantly to antici-
note 13, at 159. This Article avoids discussion of that issue since its focus is on environ-
mental law and policy and not on each of the variables. 
58 Masters et aI., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 159 
59 Masters et al., Environmental Pollution, supra note 13, at 32. 
60 Concern about the ecological fallacy should be especially heightened among law-
yers, in light of several well-publicized misuses of scientific data. See generally MARCIA AN-
GELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAw IN THE BREAST 
IMPLANT CASE (1996). Angell discusses the ecological fallacy-without using the term of 
art. See id. at 98. 
61 "Although epidemiologists are increasingly aware of such synergistic interactions, 
most conventional models of violent crime have looked at individual variables rather than 
complex effects of ecological and lifestyle factors on brain chemistry and behavior." Mas-
ters et al., Environmental Pollution, supra note 13, at 32. 
62 Possibilities suggested by Michael McGuire, a professor of psychiatry and biobehav-
ioral science at the University of California at Los Angeles, would be longitudinal studies 
or animal studies on non-human primates. Telephone Interview with Professor Michael 
McGuire, UCLA (June 3, 1998). Diana Fishbein, a criminologist and psychobiologist at the 
University of Maryland, offered that human control groups might be formed where the 
head hair of subjects was tested for possible toxic contamination, or to perform blood 
assays on a subject population. Telephone Interview with Diana Fishbein, Criminolo-
gist/Psychobiologist, University of Maryland (Mar. 25, 1998). Adrian Raine, a professor of 
clinical neuroscience, observed that this "very exciting [neurotoxicity] research" next 
needs "experimental intervention studies" to test the credibility of the findings. Telephone 
Interview with Professor Adrian Raine (Feb. 10, 1998) (notes on file with author). 
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pate potential problems with the data. To this end, Masters and his 
team further scrutinized their data, noting that "[t]he correlations 
between environmental pollution and crime interact significantly with 
population density."63 Thus, for example, the researchers found that 
in densely-populated counties with lead and manganese pollution, 
there were "970 violent crimes per 100,000, or three times the na-
tional average, while the four low density counties with similar neuro-
toxicity have only 138 violent crimes per 100,000."64 The evidence is 
highly suggestive that the "stress involved in urban living has neuro-
chemical correlates that exacerbate the effects of neurotoxicity."65 In 
short, toxic pollution seems likely to constitute a previously unsus-
pected risk factor that contributes, perhaps significantly, to geo-
graphic differences in violence. As Masters and his colleagues there-
fore conclude, their findings indicate that "urbanism, ethnicity and 
toxicity emerge as important correlates of violent crime."66 As a result, 
"the traditional approaches to crime in the United States need to be 
reconsidered from an ecological point of view. "67 
For Masters and his group, political scientists and neuroscientists 
by training, there are at least four important policy implications of the 
Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. Subject to further empirical confirmation, 
for example, they have suggested that, first, proof of the Neurotoxicity 
Hypothesis will result in increased individual responsibility for criminal 
behavior.68 That is, ifwe can reliably identify an individual's biochem-
ical susceptibility to impulsive behavior, it will be possible to hold an 
individual personally responsible for failing to take steps to control his 
behavior.69 Second, they project that improved educational perform-
ance will be possible as a result once the hypothesis is more conclu-
sively proven and widely accepted. Because "[t]he link between die-
tary deficiency, neurotoxicity and violence has also been associated 
with low I.Q. and learning disabilities ... nutritional components of 
Head Start, school lunch programs, and food stamps may be of great 
importance, provided they are monitored for necessary vitamins and 
63 Masters et al., Environmental Pollution, supra note 13, at 33. 
64 [d. 
65 [d. 
66 [d. at 37. 
67 [d. 
66 For example, it may be important to correct calcium deficiencies, since calcium is 
key to blocking uptake of manganese. See Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 
172-73. 
69 See id. at 171. 
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minerals. "70 Third, Masters and his colleagues are hopeful that further 
proof of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis will have economic benefits in 
the form of vitamin supplementation that, in the long term, would be 
far less costly than incarceration as a means of rehabilitating violent 
criminals.71 Fourth and finally, they speculate that proof that "violence 
is associated with abnormal brain biochemistry" will help screen vio-
lent criminals for biochemical imbalances and, thus, lead to further 
improvements in the administration of criminal justice. 72 Masters and 
his collaborators are quick to note, however, that improving criminal 
justice administration should not become a means to react in an 
overly-punitive manner, adding that "it is also essential to consider the 
ethical and legal implications of our approaches to criminal vio-
lence."73 
1. Individual Criminal Liability 
Despite this admonition, Masters and his associates steadfastly 
maintain that, no matter how strong the connection between neuro-
toxic contamination and crime revealed by their research, the princi-
ple of mens rea should not be abandoned.74 Masters, in fact, believes 
that neurotoxicity data may heighten rather than diminish individual 
responsibility, since the effects of the contamination can be controlled 
to some extent through measures such as an improved diet.75 That a 
researcher documenting the likely influence of what are typically 
classified as "external" causes of crime should hew to the principle of 
mens rea, which typically looks to choices within an individual's con-
trol, is a noteworthy feature of his research. In particular, if it is true 
that, as Masters' research suggests, poorer members of certain racial 
minority groups are disproportionately affected by neurotoxic con-
tamination, an unwavering insistence on the notion of mens rea could 
7°Id. at 171-72. 
71 See id. at 172. 
72Id. 
73 Masters et ai., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 172. 
74 See Masters, Environmental PoUution and Crime, supra note 13, at 359 & n.l (citing 
source which concludes that, in addition to being the locus of neurochemical processes, 
the nature of the central nervous system is such that "moral and law abiding behavior 
needs to be seen as a skill'). 
75 See Masters et aI., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 171 (noting that "some people 
are particularly likely to engage in impulsive behavior after consuming alcohol or 
drugs .... If such a vulnerability can be reliably identified, we can hold such individuals 
responsible for avoiding alcoholic beverages and drugs, much as is now the case with re-
peat offenders for driving under the influence."). 
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have volatile political implications. On one hand, the hypothesis 
seems to present data that would be most welcome to the political left 
since it offers an explanation for criminal action that focuses on 
larger social explanations for crime, rather than on some individual 
action. For example, evidence of neurotoxicity could become a new 
form of individual criminal defense like involuntary intoxication, 
which may result in acquittal for certain types of criminal offenses.?6 
On the other hand, however, an insistence on the application of 
mens rea-for the reasons mentioned above-also could provide grist 
to a conservative view of criminal behavior since it focuses attention 
back on the choice of the errant individual. That is, neurotoxicity 
could be used to make even more likely a finding of criminal liability 
for persons who failed to correct a toxic condition. A prosecutor thus 
might argue that because a defendant had been identified as having 
elevated blood lead and manganese levels, that individual was respon-
sible to take steps to mitigate the effects of the contamination. If the 
defendant had not taken steps to correct those known levels and still 
committed a violent crime, neurotoxic contamination might be used 
to underline a case arguing malicious or, at a minimum, reckless be-
havior." 
2. Mens Rea and Criminal Liability for Environmental Discharges of 
Toxic Substances 
Strikingly, the discussion of mens rea and neurotoxicity has fo-
cused almost exclusively on the kinds of possibilities sketched out 
above. That is, the discussion has concentrated on the mental state of 
violent individuals whose behavior may have been caused in some 
measure by exposure to neurotoxic heavy metals. Mens rea needs to be 
evaluated, however, with respect to any person whose behavior is im-
plicated by neurotoxicity, including those responsible for discharges 
of neurotoxic materials into the environment. This Article now turns, 
therefore, to the question of the implications of neurotoxicity re-
search for the understanding of mens rea as applied to the prosecution 
offederal environmental crimes. 
76 This refers, in particular, to general-intent offenses and offenses based upon Model 
Penal Code (MPC) standards of liability. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 305-07 (2d ed. 1995). 
77 A major concern presented by such an argument is that such a prosecution would 
proceed on the assumption that such a defendant, who is likely to be poor and marginal-
ized, would have the opportunity to learn about this research and any consequent obliga-
tions, and have the means to correct the problem. 
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As the federal environmental crime example makes clear, insist-
ing on the inviolability of mens rea is much easier said than done. Mas-
ters' insistence on not abandoning mens rea may be a way to ensure 
that the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis be given more serious considera-
tion by criminologists and politicians.78 But the mere statement that 
mens rea should not be abandoned glosses over a host of extremely 
complicated questions. Mens rea is, famously, one of the most ill-
defined concepts in Anglo-American criminal law. In Justice Holmes' 
oft-quoted view, "most of the difficulties as to the mens rea [are] due to 
having no precise understanding [of] what the mens rea is. "79 In par-
ticular, as discussed below, a uniform notion of mens rea has not been 
consistently applied in cases of environmental crime, owing, at least in 
part, to some apparent moral ambivalence about holding people 
criminally liable for environmental harm. As explained in the next 
section, inconsistent application of a mens rea standard is likely to be 
exacerbated by the results of the neurotoxicity research described 
above. This Article now turns, therefore, to some of the legal implica-
tions of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis-and above all, the implications 
for criminal intent standards. 
II. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND THE NEUROTOXICITY 
HYPOTHESIS 
The principal statute to be examined in this section is the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, more popularly known as the Clean Wa-
ter Act (CWA) ,80 although reference will also be made to two other 
central environmental laws, namely the Clean Air Act (CAA) ,81 and 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 82 With 
respect to the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, these statutes could prove 
particularly important inasmuch as the majority of releases of toxic 
heavy metals occur by air, water, or through improperly-handled haz-
ardous waste. Therefore, consideration of the civil and criminal en-
forcement provisions of these statutes provides an excellent opportu-
nity to assess the potential responsiveness of federal environmental 
laws to the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. 
78 See Masters, Environmental Pollution and Crime, supra note 13, at 359. 
79 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND 
HAROLD]' LASKI, 1916-1935, at 4-5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard University Press 
1953). 
80 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377 (West 1999). 
81 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1999). 
82 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (West 1999). 
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This Section will begin by examining the criminal and civil en-
forcement sections of the CWA in light of the Neurotoxicity Hypothe-
sis. This is crucially important because neurotoxicity research will 
likely require the legal system to consider the mens rea of those who 
create toxic contamination leading to violent, neurotoxic-influenced 
behavior. 
The CWA is a useful example for several reasons. First, water-
borne exposures to heavy metals are not uncommon.83 Second, the 
CWA is a fairly typical environmental statute in structure; the CWA is 
supported by a complex regulatory apparatus and sets not only fed-
eral water quality standards but also many state standards through the 
delegation process.84 Third, like other principal environmental stat-
utes, the CWA provides for citizen suits.85 All of these characteristics 
make it worth studying in view of the fact that wider publication of 
neurotoxicity research likely will result in lawsuits marshaling neuro-
toxicity data in support of claims under federal and state environ-
mental statutes. This may lead, in turn, to criminal prosecutions. 
Fourth, the CWA traditionally has been enforced according to a best 
available treatment (BAT) standards model,8s in contrast to the CAA's 
airshed management model. As discussed below, these different mod-
els could affect the outcome of lawsuits brought using evidence of 
neurotoxic contamination.87 Fifth, and perhaps most importantly in 
the context of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, "[t]he confrontation 
over mens rea in the [United States] Supreme Court is instead most 
likely to arise in a felony prosecution brought pursuant to the Clean 
Water Act. "88 Therefore, it is advisable to attempt to head off the pos-
sibility of such a confrontation sooner rather than later. 
83 See generally ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, LEGACY OF LEAD: AMERICA'S CoNTINU-
ING EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING 19-20 (1990); NATURAL RESOURCES DE-
FENSE COUNCIL, THE LEAD CONTAMINATION CONTROL ACT: A STUDY IN NON-COMPLIANCE 
(1991). 
84 The delegation process is described in most standard environmental texts. Of 
course, state common law is also an important environmental enforcement tool. See, e.g., 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE AND POLICY 
117-223 (2d ed. 1996). 
85 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
86 BAT stands for "Best Available Technology Economically Achievable." OLGA L. 
MOYA AND ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: THE USER'S GUIDE 356 
(West). 
87 See infra Section lILA. 
88 Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court 
Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 861, 879 (1996) (also citing the possibility of a liability 
standard confrontation under either RCRA or the CAA). 
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A. Criminal Provisions of Major Federal Environrn.ental Statutes 
1. Clean Water Act 
a. Statutory Scope 
The most comprehensive criminal statutory scheme contained in 
any major federal environmental law appears in the CWA. As with 
many federal environmental laws, the CWA's principal criminal en-
forcement sections have a tripartite structure. First, the statute creates 
penalties for negligent violations.89 Second, it penalizes knowing vio-
lations.90 Third, and finally, the CWA punishes knowing endanger-
ment.91 
In each case, these provisions focus on what a violator knew or 
reasonably should have known. Thus, for example, negligent violation 
of the CWA subjects a person to punishment, with fines of up to 
$25,000 per day of violation, and/or imprisonment of up to one year 
(with double penalties following first convictions under this subsec-
tion) when she either negligently violates the CWN s national effluent 
limitations, water quality, and treatment standards, or: 
negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly 
owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous sub-
stance which such person knew or reasonably should have 
known could cause personal injury or property damage or, 
other than in compliance with all applicable Federal, State, 
or local requirements or permits, which causes such treat-
ment works to violate any effluent limitation or condition in 
any permit issued to the treatment works.92 
The provision for "knowing" violations tracks the above-quoted lan-
guage exactly, excepting that the first word above-"negligently"-
becomes "knowingly. "95 The penalties for knowing violations, however, 
are greater: up to $50,000 per day of violation and/or imprisonment 
for up to three years.94 Importantly, federal case law interpreting the 
89 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(I). 
90 Seeid. § 1319(c)(2). 
91 See id. § 1319(c)(3). In addition, the CWA criminally punishes false statements, and 
"treatment of single operational upset." [d. §§ 1319(c)(4), (5). ThisArtic1e will not address 
these provisions since they are relatively less important than the others. 
92 [d. § 1319(c) (1) (B). 
95 Seeid. § 1319(c)(2). 
94 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). 
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"knowing" standard has consistently provided that the reqUIsIte 
knowledge needed to establish a violation is merely knowledge that 
the materials discharged into waterways are dangerous, and not that 
the discharge is illega1.95 This is in keeping with the ambitious aims of 
the statute, although commentators often point out that such a com-
paratively low threshold for a finding of criminal liability creates con-
siderable enforceability problems.96 
The knowing endangerment provision differs somewhat from the 
previous two in that they concern actions that place "another person 
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury," with fines of 
"not more than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, 
or both." 97 As with both negligent and knowing violations, violations 
after first convictions are subject to double fines and terms of impris-
onment. Additionally, this section addresses problems of proof for 
purposes of determining whether an individual knowingly endan-
gered the life or well-being of another. Circumstantial evidence that a 
defendant affirmatively attempted to shield herself from knowledge of 
potential harm may be submitted (although defendant has a statutory 
affirmative defense to such evidence). 98 
95 See generally United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997). 
96 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 88, at 864-67; see also Section IIA.l.b, infra. 
97 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (3) (A). In each of the three statutes examined here, "serious 
bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, uncon-
sciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." Id. 
§ 1319(c)(3) (B)(iv); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(f) (6), 
7413(c) (5) (F) (West 1999). 
Id. 
98 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c) (3) (B). Section 1319(c) (3) (B) provides, in relevant part: 
[I]n determining whether a defendant who is an individual knew that his 
conduct placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury-
(I) the person is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief that he 
possessed; and 
(II) knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant but not by 
the defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant; 
Except that in proving the defendant's possession of actual knowledge, 
circumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant 
took affirmative steps to shield himself from relevant information .... [How-
ever] a defendant may establish an affirmative defense under this subpara-
graph by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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Additional affirmative defenses to this section include explana-
tions that "the person endangered and that the danger and conduct 
charged were reasonably foreseeable hazards of ... an occupation, a 
business or a profession," or "medical treatment or medical or sci-
entific experimentation. "99 
b. Interpretation and the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis 
In light of the neurotoxicity research described in Part I of this 
Article, the issue presented by CWA's criminal liability standards is 
simple; subject to scientific confirmation of the Neurotoxicity Hy-
pothesis (or similar neuroscientific research), EPA and/or state agen-
cies will be compelled to lower the acceptable discharges of neuro-
toxic heavy metals into the environment. This, in turn, is sure to lead 
to increased CWA criminal prosecutions, under each of the criminal 
liability provisions described above. For example, under federal law, 
lead and cadmium are currently classified as "toxic pollutants" subject 
to national effiuent discharge limitations under the CWAlOO Once the 
acceptable discharge thresholds are reduced, permit and other regu-
latory violations will be more prevalent, thereby expanding the field 
of criminal prosecution under the CWAIOI As described in the previ-
ous subsection, most observers already consider a determination of 
CWA criminal liability to be relatively easy.I02 If, in addition, threshold 
levels for discharge of toxic heavy metals into the environment are 
dramatically lowered, criminal liability could become commonplace. 
This, in turn, could further exacerbate the inconsistent application of 
criminal liability provisions under federal environmental laws such as 
the CWA In no respect is this inconsistency clearer than in the case of 
99 Id. 
100 See id. § 1317(a) (authorizing EPA to publish a list of toxic pollutants subject to the 
CWA); see also 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (West 1999) (setting forth the CWA's list of toxic pollut-
ants). 
101 The kind of lawsuit envisioned here would be one using neurotoxicity data to 
prosecute facts similar to those establishing criminal liability in United States 'U Wells Metal 
Finishing, Inc. See 922 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1991). In Wells, a metal finishing plant was found 
to have released excess amounts of zinc and cyanide into a public sewer system, "vastly in 
excess of federal pretreatment limits." Id. The appellate court refused to overturn defen-
dant's conviction in light of convincing evidence that "[t]oo much zinc and cyanide could 
kill beneficial microorganisms in the treatment plant and render its operations much less 
efficient and therefore much more costly." Id. at 57. The First Circuit also noted dtat "ex-
cessive amounts of cyanide may mix widt acidic sewer wastes to form highly ledtal cyanide 
gas." Id. 
102 See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text. 
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what is meant by the term "criminal intent" for purposes of an envi-
ronmental crime. 
i. The Problem of Criminal Intent 
Simply put, courts are confused as to what constitutes criminal 
intent for purposes of the federal environmental statutes. This confu-
sion stems largely from disagreement as to whether common law 
"general" and "specific" intent categories should be used, or whether 
MPC categories should apply. This subsection will examine that con-
fusion. Ultimately, the analysis indicates, the MPC standards are pref-
erable because they employ a more objective test. No matter which set 
of categories is used to analyze criminal intent, however, data like that 
produced by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis raises a serious possibility 
of increased criminal liability for environmental violations. 
Susan Mandiberg has made the case that it is necessary to define 
a normative jurisprudence for environmental crimes in particular, 
and many regulatory crimes more generally.10ll As Mandiberg notes, in 
the regulatory crime context there is considerable "confusion about 
mental state [that] results from the lack of a coherent jurisprudential 
framework for federal regulatory crimes," a situation complicated by 
the fact that "the Supreme Court has increasingly interpreted regula-
tory crimes by reference to the traditional common-law notion of mens 
rea, which it treats as a normative concept. "104 As Mandiberg further 
explains, however, current analysis of federal regulatory crimes like 
those identified in the principal environmental statutes, "is not yet 
103 See generally Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory 
Crimes: The Environmental Exampk, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165 (1995) [hereinafter The Dilemma of 
Mental State]; Susan F. Mandiberg, Moral Issues in Environmental Crime, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
LJ. 881 (1996). See also generally Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: 
Simpk Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 4 (1992) (stating that "[g]iven the 
serious nature of the [environmental] crimes and penalties involved, the complexity of the 
laws, and the broad applicability of the federal environmental laws to American society; a 
higher level of culpability [than "knowing" violations] should be imposed, either as a mat-
ter of prosecutorial discretion or through statutory amendment."); Richard]. Lazarus, 
Assimilating Environmental Protection Into Legal Ruks and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 
27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 867 (1994) [hereinafter Assimilating Environmental Protection]; Richard 
]. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming 
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. LJ. 2407 (1995) [hereinafter Meeting the Demands]; 
Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court Tea Leaves, supra 
note 88; Richard]. Lazarus, The Reality of Environmental Law in the Prosecution of Environ-
mental Crimes: A Reply to the Department of Justice, 83 GEO. LJ. 2539 (1995); Lois]. Schiffer & 
James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environmental Criminals: A Response to Professor 
Lawrus, 83 GEO. LJ. 2531 (1995). 
104 Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 1167-68. 
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well suited to answering some of the thorny questions that regulatory 
crime statutes present. "105 In particular, she notes the Supreme Court 
has applied an analytical framework that, following a common law 
paradigm, applies "specific intent" principles to some regulatory 
crimes and "general intent" principles to others (notably to crimes 
deemed "public welfare offenses") .106 
As Mandiberg argues, however, it is important to recognize that 
the common law categories, which will be discussed more fully below, 
have been applied in the prosecution of environmental crimes where 
the meaning of the relevant statutory standards is unsettled with re-
spect to the requisite mens rea,I07 By contrast, Richard Lazarus has vig-
orously argued that the "nonintegration" of criminal law standards 
and environmental law standards has created serious problems for the 
long-term success and credibility of the federal model of criminal en-
vironmentallaw,I08 Mandiberg's approach suggests, however, that the 
"nonintegration" that Lazarus identifies may be less serious a problem 
than it at first glance appears. Instead, her analysis suggests that al-
though the application of common law mens rea standards to the 
prosecution of federal statutory environmental crimes may have made 
their enforcement confusing and inconsistent, it does not necessarily 
indicate fundamentally different ways of thinking about environ-
mental and criminal law enforcement,I09 
105 [d. at 1168. 
106 See id. at 1205-06. 
107 See id. at 1177-79. 
108 See Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2412. Lazarus is not alone in 
these concerns. See generally Michael Herz, Structures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 
FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 679 (1996) (examining differing enforcement priorities between the 
Department of Justice and the EPA). 
109 See generally Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103. One respect in 
which Lazarus may overstate his case is in his view of criminal law as essentially static, as 
when he observes that one of the fundamental differences between criminal and environ-
mental law is that "[c]riminallaw emphasizes settled norms, while environmental law con-
stantly changes and aspires for fundamental and dramatic change." [d. at 2445. See also 
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 103, at 879-85. What Lazarus 
clearly overlooks, however, is that criminal law can be equally dynamic and unsettled. Ex-
amples of this include the criminalization of activities like "date rape," "stalking," and oth-
ers that were not traditionally viewed as criminal behavior. For an overview of the emer-
gence of activities not previously subject to criminal prosecution, see Sanford Kadish, Fifty 
Years of Criminal Law: An opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REv. 943, 975-78 (1999) (discuss-
ing the impact of feminism on the criminal law). Notable examples include the de-
criminalization of consensual sodomy. See, e.g., LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 87-88 
(1993) (noting that "[a]s of 1961, all fifty states in the United States still had some sort of 
sodomy laws on their books. Today, fewer than half the states do."(citation omitted». A 
more recent example is the effort to de-criminalize marijuana use for medical purposes. 
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The application of common law principles to federal statutory 
environmental crimes, in fact, may reflect a fundamental unwilling-
ness to apply the existing, "knowing" statutory standards, standards 
rooted in the conceptual reforms of the MPC.ll0 It may be that resis-
tance to the application of the statutory standards does not stem from 
a belief that environmental harms do not merit prosecution. Rather, it 
is possible that the resistance is due to the broad reach of those stan-
dards or because environmental malefactors, unlike many common 
law criminals, perform social services even as they commit acts for 
which criminal liability should be assessed.111 
In addition, the ambiguity of federal environmental statutes may 
have forced courts to insert common law paradigms into the analysis 
of statutory standards. For example, although the CWA punishes 
"knowing" violations, it does not explain what a defendant is charged 
with knowing. Thus, case law has focused to an exceptional degree on 
questions such as whether a defendant charged with criminal liability 
under the CWA knew merely whether the materials discharged in ex-
See, e.g., Ethan A. Nadelmann, New Approach to Drugs That's Grounded Not in Ignorance or Fear 
But Common Sense, CHI. ThIB., Oct. 10, 1999, at C23 (advocating decriminalization for 
medical marijuana). But see Reno opposes Medical Marijuana Initiatives, The White House 
Bull., Oct. 7, 1999 (stating official White House view against such efforts, "until or unless 
scientists or medical experts find specific medicinal properties unique to marijuana") 
(LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File). 
110 In fact, congressional amendment may be understood to reflect the MPC's concep-
tual clarifications. As the Eighth Circuit noted in United States v. Sinskey: 
In 1987, Congress amended the act [33 U.S.C. Sec. 1319 (c) (2) (A)] in part to 
increase deterrence by strengthening the criminal sanctions for its violation. 
See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1104, at 138 (1986) and S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 
29-30 (1985). To that end, Congress changed the term "willfully" to "know-
ingly" in that section of the act dealing with intentional violations. See 133 
Cong. Rec. H131 (daily ed.Jan. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. J. Howard), re-
printed in 1987 u.S.C.C.A.N. 5, 28, and 33 U.S.C. § 1319, historical and statu-
tory notes, 1987 amendment, at 197 (West Supp. 1997). Although Congress 
did not explicitly discuss this change, it may logically be viewed as an effort to 
reduce the mens rea necessary for a conviction, as the word "willfully" gener-
ally connotes acting with the knowledge that one's conduct violates the law, 
while the word "knowingly" normally means acting with an awareness of one's 
actions. 
119 F.3d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1997). 
Sanford Kadish recently called the promulgation of the MPC "[ t] he event of looming 
significance this past half-century in the field of criminal law." SANFORD KADISH & STE-
PHEN SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 946, 947-53 
(5th ed. 1989). 
III That is to say, for example, that while most would agree that the life-harming re-
lease of cadmium merits criminal conviction, few would support an end to manufacture of 
long-life cadmium batteries. 
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cess of permitted levels were toxic, or whether the discharge was un-
permitted.1l2 
Because neurotoxicity research is likely to force a drastic reduc-
tion of acceptable levels of toxic materials that may be discharged into 
the environment, these problems in assessing federal environmental 
criminal liability are likely to become even more acute. In short, neu-
rotoxicity research suggests that pollution may have even more devas-
tating health consequences than previously thought. This may open 
the door to increased litigation. Moreover, whatever the nature of the 
underlying differences, if any, between environmental and criminal 
law, both Lazarus and Mandiberg agree that the analytical framework 
used to establish mens rea under federal environmental statutes is un-
satisfactory.I!!1 
The reasons for this deserve consideration as they bear directly 
upon the potential challenges the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis presents 
for enforcement of federal environmental crimes. A difference be-
tween many environmental and common law crimes is that, for most 
statutory environmental crimes, a prosecutor is not required to prove 
a number of different elements in order to establish environmental 
criminal liability.114 However, this has not stopped courts-even the 
Supreme Court-from attempting to impose a classical common law 
mens rea framework onto the language of "knowing" environmental 
crimes, like violations of the CWA. This is true even where, as with the 
CWA, the statute is silent as to criminal intent.ll5 
In her examination of Supreme Court regulatory crimes juris-
prudence, Mandiberg concludes that a two-part structure has been 
developed "for interpreting mental state in ambiguous federal regula-
tory crime statutes. "116 That structure, she concludes, closely tracks 
common law crime distinctions.ll '7 
112 See Section llIA, infra. 
us See Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2412; Mandiberg, The Dikmma of 
Mental State, supra note 103, at 1167-68. 
114 See Mandiberg, The Dikmma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 117~76 (discussing 
inconsistent approaches as to what might be proved to establish a scienter requirement 
underRCRAand the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994}). 
115 See id. at 1201-02 (discussing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), a prose-
cution under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1988)}. Like the CWA, 
the statute at issue in Staples did not speak to mental state (M[s]ilence on this point by itself 
does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens 
rea element"). See Staples, 511 U.S. at 605. 
116 Mandiberg, supra note 103, at 1203. 
117 See id. at 1204-15. 
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Specifically, Mandiberg notes that the Court classifies some regu-
latory crimes as "public welfare offenses," using an analysis that closely 
parallels the common law category of "general intent" crimes.11S A 
general intent crime is one where culpability is "objectively as-
sessed. "119 That is to say, '" [g] eneral' intent can mean a number of 
different things, but in this context it generally means that it is 
sufficient to convict when the defendant did what in ordinary speech 
we would call simply an intentional action."120 A specific intent crime 
is one in which, by contrast, culpability "is subjectively assessed. The 
prosecution must prove that the defendant engaged in the actions 
'with some specified purpose in mind' or that the defendant was sub-
jectivelyaware 'of some specific circumstance."'121 
For example, bigamy is a general intent crime, while burglary, 
which requires a breaking and entering under cover of night with the 
specific intent to commit a crime therein, is a specific intent crime.122 With-
out an intention to commit a crime such as theft therein, a defendant 
would only be guilty of criminal trespass. This distinction, however, is 
not one that lends itself to intellectual clarity. As Joshua Dressler 
notes: 
[t]he terms 'specific intent' and 'general intent' are the 
bane of criminal law students and lawyers. This is because 
the terms are critical to understanding various common law 
rules of criminal responsibility, yet the concepts are so 'noto-
riously difficult ... to define and apply. . . [that] a number 
of text writers recommend that they be abandoned alto-
gether,123 
Nonetheless, Mandiberg observes that "general" and "specific 
intent" crimes "parallel ... the Court's regulatory crime catego-
ries .... The 'public welfare offense' category is at least superficially 
similar to 'general intent' in some striking ways," notably "conduct-
circumstance combinations that are so dangerous and uncommon 
118 See id. 
119 [d. at 1206. 
120 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 110, at 230. 
121 Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 1206 (citing, inter alia, 
KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 110; DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 109-10). 
122 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 140.25 (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459-460 (West 
1999). 
123 DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 118 (citations omitted) (ellipses and bracketed text in 
the original). See id. at 102-03 (quoting various authorities on the ambiguity of the term 
mens rea). See also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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that everyone should know they are regulated. "124 She further ex-
plains that "[t]here are even more compelling parallels between 'in-
nocent activity offenses' and 'specific intent' crimes. "125 To be exact, 
"[i]n traditional 'specific intent,' the defendant is subjectively aware 
of a circumstance, goal, or motive that is immoral in the traditional 
sense. This may also be true in 'innocent activity offenses' when the 
'something extra' is the defendant's awareness of violating the law."126 
In the context of criminal clean water violations, a public welfare of-
fense that is comparable to the common law "general intent" category 
would be any discharge of substances known to be toxic to humans, so 
long as such discharge is "uncommon. "127 By contrast, in the "inno-
cent activity offense" context, a criminal clean water violation parallel-
ing a common law "specific intent" crime might be the deliberate vio-
lation of a permitted discharge that had the effect of endangering the 
public. 
Mandiberg concludes her comparison by observing that the Su-
preme Court has developed what she identifies as a two-step protocol 
for analyzing regulatory crimes. At a deep level, this protocol is in-
formed by the common law of crimes and the "traditional normative 
jurisprudence" that the common law reflects. Specifically, she argues: 
[i]f the Court can say that the situation is physically danger-
ous and uncommon enough to cause widespread community 
concern, the crime is a 'public welfare offense.' In those 
cases, mens rea consists of the defendant's awareness of en-
gaging in that conduct under those circumstances. For other 
statutes, the crime is an 'innocent activity offense'; mens rea 
therefore consists of the defendant's awareness of the con-
duct, the factual circumstances, and either the law or a 
probable unlawful consequence.128 
124 Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 1210. ·Perhaps" Mandi-
berg muses, ·'public welfare offenses' are the 'general intent' crimes of the modern era." 
Id. 
125 Id. at 1220. 
126 Id. 
127 Cf. United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) 
(transport of dangerous chemicals). As Mandiberg notes, the jurisprudential basis of the 
·uncommon" requirement is unclear. Her observation is accepted for purposes of this 
Article, although it merits further consideration. For a discussion of the requirement, see 
Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 1212-13. 
128 Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 1215. 
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These distinctions go to the heart of the difficulties courts and com-
mentators have had with the assessment of criminal liability for envi-
ronmental crimes. In no case is this contrast more clear than in United 
States v. Weitzenhofp29 
Perhaps more than any other CWA criminal prosecution, Weitzen-
hoff has occasioned both stern disapproval and widespread celebra-
tion for its reading of the CWA's mens rea requirement.l30 In Weitzen-
hoff, the managers of a sewage treatment plant on the Hawaiian island 
of Oahu were found guilty of conspiring to discharge pollutants into 
the ocean near a popular swimming and surfing beach.m The case 
presented an issue of first impression before a federal Court of Ap-
peals, namely whether the district court was correct in "construing 
'knowingly' in section 1319(c) (2) [of the CWA] as requiring only that 
[defendants] were aware that they were discharging the pollutants in 
question, not that they knew they were violating the terms of the stat-
ute or permit."132 The Court noted that "[a]s with certain other 
criminal statutes that employ the term 'knowingly,' it is not apparent 
from the face of the statute whether 'knowingly' means a knowing 
violation of the law or simply knowing conduct that is violative of the 
law."U3 Mter reviewing the legislative history for section 1319(c)(2), 
the Court concluded that "congressional explanations of the new 
penalty provisions strongly suggest that criminal sanctions are to be 
imposed on an individual who knowingly engages in conduct that re-
129 Seegenerally 1 F.3d 1523 (9thCir. 1993). 
uo See, e.g., Kevin P. Cichetti, United States u Weitunlwffl Reading (JUt the "Knowingly -from 
the "Knowingly Vwlates" in the Clmn Water Act, 9 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1, 183 (1996); Richard G. 
Cohn-Lee, Mens Rea and Permit Interpretation Under the Clean Water Act: United States u 
Weitunlwff, 24 ENvn.. L. 1351, 1354-57 (1994) (arguing that Weitunhoffcorrectly applied 
the CWA as a "general intent" statute by placing the burden to resolve permit ambiguities 
on the permittee); Katherine H. Setness, Statutory Interpretation of Clean Water Act Section 
1319(c)(2)(A)'s Kn(fW/edge Requirrmumt: Reconciling the Needs of Environmental and Criminal 
Law, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 447, 450 (1996) (criticizing Weitunlwjjs analysis) [hereinafter Statu-
tmy Interpretation of Clmn Water Act Section 1319( c)(2)(A) 's Kn(fW/edge Requirrmumt]; Kepten D. 
Carmichael, Note, Strict Criminal Liability for Environmental Violations: A Need for judicial Re-
straint, 7I IND. LJ. 729,731, 748-52 (1996) (criticizing Weitunlw/fs "public welfare" read-
ing of the CWA as an example of de facto strict liability and its "intolerable implications" for 
environmental regulatory violations); Michael J. Penders, Innocents at Risk? The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 2 ENVTL. L. 835, 841 (1996) (book review) 
(discussing the Weitunlwff court's interpretation of the CWA as a "public welfare" statute). 
See generally Ruth Ann Wendell et aI., Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Prosecu-
tion, 21 SETON HAll. L. REv. 1100 (1991). 
lSI See 1 F.3d at 1527-28 n.l. 
152 Id. at 1529. 
133 Id. Curiously, the Ninth Circuit did not specify the "certain other criminal statutes" 
to which it referred. See id. 
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suIts in a permit violation, regardless of whether the polluter is cogni-
zant of the requirements or even the existence of the permit. "134 
Moreover, the Court made clear that in so reading the statutory lan-
guage of the CWA's "knowing" violations, it viewed the CWA as a 
"public welfare" statute.135 
Thus, to return to Mandiberg's explanatory scheme, in Weitzen-
hoff the Court understood the CWNs knowing violation provision 
much as it would a "general intent" crime in the sense that defendants 
intentionally authorized employees to discharge waste directly into 
the ocean.136 The opinion further makes clear, however, that the 
Court recognized the possible strength of an argument to the effect 
that the provision is more like a "specific" than a "general intent" 
crime. Specifically, the Court explicitly rejected defendant-appellants' 
lMId. 
155 The Weitzenhoff court thus analogized the CWA to federal statutes concerning the 
transport of corrosive liquids, management of hazardous wastes, drug shipments, and use 
of firearms. The court thus cited, respectively, United States v. International Minerals & Chem. 
Carp., 402 u.s. 558 (1971) (dealing with the transport of corrosive liquids); United States v. 
Hoflin, 880 F.2d lO33 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that knowledge of absence of a permit is not 
required for a RCRA violation); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 u.s. 277 (1943) (construing 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); and United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 
1988) (stating that proof that defendant knew she/he was violating law was not required to 
establish violation of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act). See Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d at 1530. 
These public welfare cases are sometimes called "strict criminal liability" offenses. For a 
discussion of these cases, their history, and the development of criminal liability standards 
in the environmental law context, see CHRISTOPHER HARRIS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMES §§ 5.03-.06 (1992). 
It is central to the argument advanced in this Article to recognize that this "public wel-
fare" reading has been applied not only in the context of the CWA, but in cases involving 
other federal environmental statutes as well. For instance, in the seminal RCRA case of 
United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit consid-
ered whether RCRA's knowing violation section, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2) (A) , "covers em-
ployees as well as owners and operators of a facility" that violated its RCRA permit. Johnson 
& Towers, 741 F.2d at 664. Examining both the statutory language and RCRA's legislative 
history, the court held, however, that: 
it is well established that criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes in-
tended to protect public health, in contrast to statutes based on common law crimes, are 
to be construed to effectuate the reg;ulatory purpose. ••• It would undercut the pur-
poses of the legislation to limit the class of potential defendants to owners 
and operators when others also bear responsibility for handling regulated 
materials. 
Id. at 665-66 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
Although Johnson & Towers is a RCRA case, the similar structure of the "knowing" lan-
guage means that this point applies with equal force to other federal environmental crimi-
nal provisions like that of the CWA. 
136 See 35 F.3d 1275, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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analogy to Liparota v. United States.1'$? In Liparota, the prosecution was 
required to demonstrate that a violation of a federal statute proscrib-
ing the unauthorized use of food stamps required proof of the defen-
dant's knowledge that he was violating the law.1l18 Unlike Liparota's 
alleged abuse of food stamp regulations however, the Court in 
Weitzenhof! insisted that knowledge of the law was immaterial for a 
finding of liability: "[t]he criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly 
designed to protect the public at large from the potentially dire con-
sequences of water pollution ... and as such fall within the category 
of public welfare legislation. "Ill9 
The Weitzenhof! court's brief colloquy on the mental state re-
quired by the CWA (and, by extension, comparable environmental 
statutes) goes to the heart of the discomfort many feel about finding 
criminal fault for violations of environmental statutes. Richard Laza-
rus's concern is typical. Lazarus worries that, to the peril of the envi-
ronmental cause, environmentalists have resisted "an argument in 
favor of accommodating the basic rights of those who violate the 
law-their right not to be incarcerated in the absence of violation of 
certain traditional norms of moral culpability."140 Lazarus's criticism 
sounds very much like a plea to transform the "general intent"-like 
public welfare crimes into "specific intent" crimes: 
Does criminal culpability turn on the defendant's awareness 
of facts with the level of precision actually determinative of 
the lawfulness of the defendant's activity? Courts have ad-
dressed this issue in a variety of environmental law contexts. 
Their virtually uniform answer is that no such rigorous proof 
of the defendant's knowledge is necessary-liability is not 
entirely strict. Yet, given the breadth and depth of relevant 
facts of which the government need not prove knowledge, 
liability for knowing violations could be fairly dubbed mostly 
strict (if such a characterization is not an oxymoron).I4I 
137 Seeid.; seegmerally471 u.s. 419 (1985). 
1~ See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
139 Weit%enhoff, 1 F.3d at 1530 (citations to legislative history omitted) . 
140 Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2529. But see Schiffer & Simon, su-
pra note 103, at 2532; if. Lazarus, The Reality of Environmental Law in the Prosecution of Envi-
ronmental Crimes, supra note 103, at 2541-43. 
141 Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2472. For Lazarus's critique of the 
application of the public welfare doctrine, see id. at 2472-84. 
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Lazarus's analysis may be faulted for failing to focus on the distinction 
between "general" and "specific intent" crimes, which is to say that 
what he sees as a flaw in the intent standards applied to environ-
mental crimes may in fact reflect an interpretive choice with which he 
disagrees. Nonetheless, Lazarus is certainly not alone in his view, and 
the chorus of agreement with him in this respect makes clear that a 
formal reevaluation of criminal environmental intent standards is 
long overdue.l42 
ii. Standards of Intent and the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis 
What do standards of intent have to do with the powerful correla-
tions between violent criminal behavior and environmental toxins 
suggested by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis? Above all, this Article 
suggests that the kind of data currently being produced in support of 
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis could well push the controversy regard-
ing the required mental state in federal environmental criminal 
prosecutions to the breaking point. That is, lawsuits for criminalliabil-
ity based on neurotoxicity data can only sharpen the concerns ad-
dressed in a case like Weitzenho!! as to the appropriate scope of crimi-
nalliability for environmental harms. Whether using a "general"- or a 
"specific intent"-like standard, neurotoxicity seems likely to produce 
even louder calls for clarification of the appropriate liability standard. 
The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, studies docu-
menting the likely role of neurotoxic contamination as a significant 
co-factor contributing to violent criminal behavior are likely to in-
crease the pressure to apply a "general intent"-like standard, as is 
presently the case with interpretation of the CWA as a "public welfare" 
statute. On the other hand, it is equally true that Lazarus' and related 
concerns will, in light of neurotoxicity data, result in ever-louder de-
mands to reform the usual intent standards that apply in criminal en-
142 See, e.g., Gaynor et aI., supra note 103, at 17-18 ("The government often tries to wa-
ter down the knowledge standard by attempting to impose, through jury instructions, an 
objective standard on the mens rea requirement, that is, to hold the defendant liable for 
factual knowledge she should have had, rather than only for that she actually possessed. 
However, it has been generally held that when a statute penalizes an act performed 'know-
ingly' there must be actual knowledge of the circumstances .... [T]he government should 
not be able to argue that a person should have known for example, that the waste was haz-
ardous, she should only be held liable if her subjective belief was that the waste was haz-
ardous.") (citing non-environmental cases; citations omitted); Setness, Statutory Interpreta-
tion of Clean Water Act Section 1319(c)(2)(A) 's Kn{fU}/.edge Requirement, supra note 130, at 459 
("Courts employ the ["public welfare" offense] doctrine to reduce or eliminate the crimi-
nallaw's general requirement of mens rea"). 
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vironmental statutes. The reason for this is simple: data supporting 
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is, as indicated previously,143 likely to 
require a downward revision of the acceptable discharges of certain 
toxic heavy metals like lead, cadmium, and manganese to levels cur-
rently deemed "sub-clinical." Such a downward revision will likely re-
sult in increased criminal prosecution of the manufacturing processes 
using those metals.l44 In addition, as evermore definite data is re-
leased, criticism of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is likely to mount, 
both from the left145 and right.l46 To the extent that neurotoxicity 
data is used by government lawyers seeking to enforce a criminal envi-
ronmental provision like that in the CWA (or by lawyers acting on be-
half of clients or others pressuring the government to bring such 
claims), pressure likely will mount for an "innocent activity"/ "specific 
143 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
144 Moreover, there is a solid basis for doing so in light of the more exacting standards 
applied by other federal environmental statutes. For example, "liability under CERCLA 
attaches regardless of the concentration of hazardous substances present in a defendant's 
waste, so long as the defendant's waste and/or contaminants in it are 'listed hazardous 
substances' pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 302.4(a). Numerous courts have [so] held." City of 
NewYorkv. Exxon Corp., 744F. Supp. 474,483 (S.D.N.Y.1990). 
145 See generaUy Sheldon M. Novick, Racial Images of the "Criminal": A Cognitive Disorder, 
22VT. L. REv. 383 (1997);Joan Vogel, Biological Theories of Human Behavior: Admonitions ofa 
Skeptic, 22 VT. L. REv. 425 (1997). Dr. Peter Breggin, a leading opponent of the use of 
behavior-modifying psychotrophic drugs like Prozac and Ritalin, also opposes biological 
explanations for behavior, which he characterizes as borne of "a long tradition that is po-
tentially racist, . . . disabling and humiliating to inner city youth." Telephone Interview 
with Dr. Peter Breggin (Jan. 1, 1998). 
146 The celebrated political scientist James Q. Wilson, after reviewing what he sees as 
the growing tension between science and law-or the conflict between explaining and 
identifying causation versus judging behavior-concludes as follows: 
[I]t is important that we let neither science nor compassion decide legal pre-
cepts. We [social scientists] want to explain, the law seeks to judge; we want to 
see the world in shades of gray, the law defines it in black and white. We wish 
verdicts to encompass the full range of human circumstances, but the law can 
range only so widely before losing its power to focus our often diffuse sense of 
self<ontrol. In extreme cases, where the law clearly does not fit, juries may 
nullify and judges may forgive, but only within the steady, lasting confines of a 
moral and legal order. 
JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL 
SYSTEM? 112 (1997). See also JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALK ABOUT CRIMES 
AND NEW VICTIMS 93-141 (1990). A considerably less restrained examination of the cul-
ture of victim hood appears in ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-
OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBIUTY (1994). C. Ray Jeffery criticizes 
traditional criminology for working on the basis of a medieval tradition of revenge and 
deterrence through punishment and prisons rather than incorporating biosocial evidence. 
SeegenerallyJeffery, Criminology and Criminal Law, supra note 8. 
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intent"-like reading of a criminal environmental provision like the 
CWA's. 
This is problematic, however, because such an approach would 
conflict with a plain meaning reading of the federal environmental 
statutory standards. As noted above, these standards proscribe any 
"knowing" violation. The possible result is widespread disagreement 
about or, at worst, disregard of, federal statutory language. Such a re-
sult has obvious negative implications for an environmental statutory 
regime founded on the rule oflaw.147 
Therefore, it is essential to seek a possible solution for this likely 
crisis in statutory interpretation. An effort is required that will both 
accommodate new findings--such as neurotoxicity data-that bear on 
the goal of a cleaner environment and also reduce the doctrinal con-
fusion over the appropriate standard of intent in criminal environ-
mental law cases. Possible solutions are outlined in Section III below. 
B. Civil Penalties 
Although this Article focuses primarily on the implications of 
neurotoxicity research for criminal liability under federal environ-
mental laws, it is useful to outline briefly the implications of neurotox-
icity research for civil liability under those statutes. This is worthwhile 
inasmuch as criminal prosecutions will in most cases be brought si-
multaneously with civil actions. 
Civil liability under the CWA (and the other principal federal en-
vironmental statutes) is expansive, and has been made even more so 
147 This is not a problem, it again deserves emphasizing, limited to the CWA. The same 
concerns would arise with respect to RCRA. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 
F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that "in a prosecution under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 
6928(d) (1) it would be no defense to claim no knowledge that the paint waste was a haz-
ardous waste within the meaning of the regulations; nor would it be a defense to argue 
ignorance of the permit requirement"); United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 
1991) (noting that "when a person knowingly possesses an instrumentality which by its 
nature is potentially dangerous, he is imputed with the knowledge that it may be regulated 
by public health legislation [such as 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928]."); United States v. Laughlin, 768 
F. Supp. 957, 966 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "based upon the overall structure of section 
6928(d) (2), Congress' objective in enacting RCRA of protecting public health and the 
environment, and applicable principles of statutory construction, the court holds that the 
government is not required to prove that defendants in this case knew that a permit was 
required by law nor that they knew that [defendant] did not have a permit in order to 
prove that defendants violated section 6928(d) (2) (A) "), a/I'd, 10 F.3d 961,963-64 (2d Cir. 
1993). But if. United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir., 1992) (holding that, in 
light of ambiguity of "knowing" requirement with respect to 42 U.S.C. section 6928( d) (1), 
finding mens rea "element conspicuously absent" with respect to transport of hazardous 
materials to an unpermitted facility). 
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by case law interpreting the statutes.I48 Although the statute's history 
spans just over a full generation, it is full of examples of private efforts 
to force the EPA and state regulators to implement standards in com-
pliance with its sweeping commands. In light of the historically broad 
reading of the CWA, the parties who would potentially be most af-
fected by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis would include government 
regulators, as well as officers and other employees of large corpora-
tions. Therefore, as evidence mounts in support of the hypothesis, 
private as well as public enforcement actions will likely increase. 
It is again essential to repeat a key assumption underlying the 
argument advanced in this Article. To be exact, this Article proceeds 
on the assumption that as studies documenting the link between neu-
rotoxic contamination and criminal behavior become more widely 
disseminated, the EPA and state environmental authorities will be 
compelled to lower the threshold for tolerable levels of discharged 
heavy metals. Thus, in light of neurotoxicity data, currently "subclini-
cal" levels will likely be reclassified as threatening to human health.I49 
148 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d) (West 1999). See also Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Train, 8 ERC 2120, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20588 (D.D.C. 1976) (deciding a citizen suit 
against EPA for failure to implement technology-based effiuent limitations for toxic sub-
stances led to requirement that EPA issue such limitations). 
149 It seems likely that this could happen. For example, in early 1999, EPA sought to 
tighten the "reporting requirements for persistent bioaccumulative toxic [PBT] chemicals" 
and "lowering the threshold for certain PBT pollutants and adding others to the list of 
chemicals for which TRI reports must be filed." Sara Thurin Rollin, Toxic Pollutants: Envi-
ronmental Groups Call for Stricter Reporting to TRI for Persistent Chemicals, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
2086 (1999) (noting also that "environmental advocates faulted EPA's failure to include 
lead and cadmium on the list of PBT substances subject to reporting"). 
For data gathered in support of the neurotoxicity hypothesis to have any bite would 
likely require revision of the effiuent standards for each of the toxic heavy metals impli-
cated by the hypothesis. At present, the permissible effiuent limitations vary considerably, 
depending on the nature of the activity. Cj, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 420.100 (West 1999) (allowing 
lead discharges into publicly-owned treatment works to as much as 0.000751 kg/kkg); 40 
C.F.R. § 41.67(g) (West 1999) (stating that BPT [best practicable control technology] 
effiuent limitations for hard lead refining slag granulation allows no lead discharge). 
These effiuent limitations are arrived at, of course, only after often lengthy review and 
comment. The data supporting the neurotoxicity hypothesis suggest, however, that estab-
lished effiuent limitations do not prevent lead poisoning sufficient to remove a co-factor 
for violent behavior: "[a]lthough the effects of early exposure to low levels of lead are of-
ten described as subclinical, the evidence for serious cognitive defects is well established." 
Masters et ai., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 157. That is, "low" lead levels may still be 
toxic in combination with other variables such as poor diet and drug use. Thus, even 
though mean blood lead levels decreased seventy-seven percent between 1976 and 1991, 
"many thousands of children continue to have toxic lead burdens, especially in minority 
communities." Needleman et al., supra note 30, at 363. In part, it is fair to assume, this is 
because lead has not been satisfactorily removed from public water supplies: 
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Release of such revised standards seem certain to result in increased 
private enforcement actions. 
1. Clean Water Act 
a. Statutory Scope 
The plain language of the CWA gives authority for the EPA Ad-
ministrator "to commence a civil action for appropriate relief, includ-
ing a permanent or temporary injunction for any violation. "150 In ad-
dition, citizen suits have become widely-used tools of CWA enforce-
ment. l5l 1t is worth noting, as well, that the list of persons subject to 
prosecution under the CWA is broad. A federal employee acting 
"within the scope of [his] employment" is subject to prosecution for 
violation of the CWA.152 This has been applied, for instance, to the 
director of a public utility with supervisory authority responsible for a 
city waste water treatment plant153 and civilians employed by the 
armed forces.154 
Although regulation of leaded gas and paint may have reduced exposure 
to solid or aerosol forms of lead, the presence of lead in water-a likely vector 
influencing neonates and infants in inner cities and aging housing-has not 
disappeared .... Even in modern multi-story buildings, water supplies in the 
upper floors may be particularly high in lead. 
Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 157-58 (references omitted). It is easy to 
imagine a lawsuit in which, for example, private interests would sue to compel the EPA to 
include subclinical levels of lead and other toxic, heavy metals to be listed as national 
effluent standards, requiring EPA to comply with its mandate under the CWA to protect 
the integrity of the nation's waterways. The argument would be straightforward: these 
levels have demonstrably been shown to compromise human health and therefore require 
stricter regulation. Following revision of such standards, it is equally possible to imagine 
violations of the new standards and resulting lawsuits. 
150 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). 
151 See gmerally Washington Pub. Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 
11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing a citizen suit even when EPA administrative compli-
ance order had also been issued). 
152 See United States v. Curtis, 988 F.2d 946, 948 (Alaska 1993). 
155 See gmerally United Statesv. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991). 
154 See gmerally United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990). In Dee, the civilian 
employees of the U.S. Army, assigned to the Chemical Research, Development, and Engi-
neering Center at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland were charged for non-
compliance with certain RCRA waste reporting requirements. Defendants attempted to 
assert that, as government employees, they were protected by sovereign immunity. How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit held that "sovereign immunity does not attach to individual gov-
ernment employees so as to immunize them from prosecution for their criminal acts." [d. 
at 744. 
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b. Interpretation and the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis 
It is appropriate to discuss the applicability of the Neurotoxicity 
Hypothesis to civil liability under the CWA because of its focus "on 
implementation of technology-based standards applicable to individ-
ual point sources of water pollution-primarily industrial facilities 
and public sewage treatment plants. "155 In the context of the Neuro-
toxicity Hypothesis, this is relevant for at least three reasons. First, if 
effluent standards for toxic heavy metals like lead, manganese, and 
cadmium are revised in light of the hypothesis, industrial facilities and 
publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs) would be more likely to 
violate permit terms. Second, in the event of revised effluent levels, 
these same facilities would be likely targets of enforcement actions or 
lawsuits. Third, however, because CWA enforcement has concentrated 
on technology-forcing standards rather than watershed management, 
industry would likely claim that the technology required to remove 
heavy metals from point source discharges would be inefficient 
and/ or that the cost of achieving such standards is economically pro-
hibitive.156 Thus, although violations of permits would likely put such 
facilities at risk of non-compliance with revised effluent levels, the fa-
cilities would have possible grounds for objection.157 
c. L.E.A.D. Group of Berks v. Exide Corp. 
An example of the way neurotoxicity data could be used in a 
CWA lawsuit is provided by the case of L.E.A.D. Group of Berks v. Exide 
155 This approach contrasts, for example, with the approach of an otherwise quite simi-
lar statute, the CAA, which aims instead to control "a diversity of sources of air pollution 
within regional airsheds." Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons 
from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 203, 207 (1999). 
156 Cf. Thomas A. Cinti, Note, The Regulator's Dilemma: Should Best Available Technology or 
Cost Benefit Analysis Be Used to Determine the Applicable Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and 
Disposal Technology?, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & 'TECH. LJ. 145, 158-63 (1990) (cataloguing 
criticisms of BAT as inefficient); John D. Graham, The Failure of AgencyForcing: The Regula-
tion of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE LJ. 138--40 
(1985) (criticizing BAT in the context of the CAA as inefficient). Graham argues that 
"[t]here is never really a 'best' available technology; there are only progressively more 
stringent and expensive abatement methods." Graham, supra, at 138--40. 
157 Remember that this is only true if citizen-plaintiffs allege "a state of continuous or 
intermittent violation-that is a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to 
pollute in the future." In other words, "citizen suits for 'wholly past violations' are not 
permitted under [Section 505] of the [CWA]." Massachusetts Pub. Interest Group v. ICI 
Americas, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D. Mass. 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57, 64 (1987». 
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Cmp,158In L.E.A.D., individual and other private plaintiffs sought relief 
under the CWA, RCRA, and state hazardous waste and clean water 
laws for claimed violations of, among other things, CWA permits.159 
The individual plaintiffs included people living near the manufactur-
ing-including lead-battery making-facilities of defendants. They 
maintained that the unpermitted release of toxic substances included 
the toxic heavy metals antinomy, cadmium, lead, iron, copper, and 
silver. To advance such claims, the court required plaintiffs to satisfy 
the three-pronged constitutional standing test advanced in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,160 Lujan requires a demonstration that a plaintiff 
(a) suffered an injury-in-fact, (b) which is fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant, and (c) that plaintiff's injuries likely 
would be redressed by a favorable decision.161 The court concluded 
that the plaintiffs in this case did not satisfy the Lujan test, but for rea-
sons unrelated to the discharge of the toxic heavy metals studied in 
connection with the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis.162 The court did find, 
however, that claims under, inter alia, the CWA, were "redressable by 
declaratory and injunctive relief," even though the allegedly harmful 
discharges were "infrequent and episodic, rather than continuing and 
ongoing violations. "163 Moreover, the court affirmed that a local clean 
environment group (the named plaintiff) had standing to sue equiva-
lent to that of any individual plaintiff. 164 
In the context of the preceding discussion about CWA and other 
federal environmental criminal liability standards, the implications of 
a case like L.E.A.D. merit attention. Specifically, wider dissemination 
of neurotoxicity research is likely to be seized upon first by individuals 
seeking civil redress for environmental harms-individuals like those 
158 See generally 1999 WI.. 124473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (slip op.). "L.EAD." stands for Local 
Environmental Awareness Development. 
159 See generally id. 
160 See 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
161 See id.; L.E.A.D., 1999 WI.. 124473, at *12. 
162 SeeL.E.A.D., 1999 WI.. 124473, at *12. 
163 The court continued: "[w]e hardly see the difference ... [e]ven if such violations 
are episodic; they have continued and there is no guarantee that they will cease." [d. at 
*19. 
164 In support of this conclusion, the Court relied on the Powell Duffryn test, which 
provides that an organization may be sued so long as "(I) the organization's members 
would have standing to sue on their own; (2) the interests that the organization seeks to 
protect are germane to its purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires individual participation by its members." [d. at *20 (citing Public Interest 
Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 
1990». 
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in the L.E.A.D. case. Such a push is likely to be especially acute with 
neurotoxicity research because of the highly negative behavioral con-
sequences of the toxic exposure. The likelihood of such lawsuits will 
certainly lead to a demand for more stringent criminal prosecution of 
those involved in industries that pollute with toxic heavy metals. 
If the liability standards used to enforce such prosecutions are 
not clarified, they will be subject to further inconsistent application. 
Following the Supreme Court's lead in regulatory crime cases, some 
courts can be expected to apply a common law general- and specific-
intent rubric. As in Weitzenhof!, however, other courts may continue to 
struggle with the ambiguous definition of "knowing" acts in the 
criminal liability provisions of the federal environmental statutes. 
Thus, civil prosecutions of the federal environmental laws, whether 
advanced by state officers or in private citizen suits, are likely to open 
the door to greater uncertainty regarding the scope of the federal 
criminal environmental standards. Even in the civil liability context, 
therefore, neurotoxicity research underscores the need to amend 
federal criminal environmental standards, in order to insure the long-
term, popular credibility of environmental prosecutions. 
III. THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 
A. The Model Penal Code, Neurotoxicity, and Federal Environmental 
Criminal Liability 
A way out of this impasse is to rethink the criminal intent stan-
dards used in federal environmental enforcement. One possible op-
tion is to make clear that the intent categories contained in the MPC 
shall apply to the CWA's statutory definitions for criminal intent. This 
approach has the advantage of discarding the common law analysis 
that, as described in the previous section, has consistently proven so 
nettlesome. 
The common law categories of "general" and "specific intent" 
stand in contrast to the "General Requirements for Culpability" set 
forth in the MPC)65 In particular, the MPC takes what has been 
classified as an "elemental" approach to mens rea, meaning that a 
prosecutor need not establish culpability in the sense that the defen-
dant's actions demonstrated "his bad character, malevolence, or im-
165 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1980). Joshua Dressler observes that "[n]o aspect of 
the Model Penal Code has had greater influence on the direction of American criminal 
law~ than this section. DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 120. 
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morality. "166 Instead, an elemental approach requires only that the 
prosecution establish "the particular mental state provided for in the 
definition of the offense. "167 Conceptually, the MPC's innovation re-
quires more than proof of moral blameworthiness (a highly norma-
tive judgment); in addition, the MPC rejects the confusion of the 
common law distinction between "general" and "specific intent" 
crimes. 
In their place, the MPC offers four statutory mens rea terms, in-
cluding "knowingly," the mental state that must be established for 
most federal environmental crimes,168 The MPC defines "knowingly" 
in two different ways, each of them with implications for the major 
federal environmental crimes, particularly because a statute like the 
CWA does not define "knowingly. "169 
First, an actor "knowingly" causes a result if he "is aware that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. "170 Con-
sider the example of a battery-manufacturing plant. In the context of 
a CWA criminal prosecution, a "knowing" release satisfying this stan-
dard would be one, for example, where a corporate officer performed 
or authorized the release of lead-contaminated sludge into a point 
source at levels in excess of permitted requirements, fully aware that 
the release was not permitted and that lead has deleterious effects on 
the nervous system and other vital functions. l71 Alternately, one can 
be found to act "knowingly" under the MPC if one is "aware that his 
conduct is of that nature or that such [attendant] circumstances ex-
ist. "172 
Awareness of the harmfulness of the conduct is central,173 Thus, 
in the example above, if the corporate officers in charge of discharges 
into the point source did not know that the lead-contaminated sludge 
contained lead in excess of permitted levels, they would not be guilty 
166 DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 103. 
167 [d. (quotations without citations in original). 
168 The others are "purposely," "recklessly," and "negligently." See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02. 
169 As of 1990, it does, however, define "knowing endangerment," a separate criminal 
offense from "knowing violations." See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(3) (B) (i) (West 1999). 
170 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (ii). 
171 In the case of environmental lead, this would not be particularly difficult to estab-
lish. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
172 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (i). 
173 See DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 122. 
2000] Neurotoxicity 383 
of a "knowing" crime. If decided under this standard, a number of 
environmental convictions may not have resulted in liability.I74 
Importantly, however, the MPC requires proof of each and every 
element of the crime, and conviction might still be possible under a 
MPC standard in those cases where "attendant circumstances" are es-
tablished. Even if a person was unaware of the conduct that caused 
harm (the actual discharge in excess of permitted levels), it nonethe-
less might be possible to establish a "knowing" violation. For instance, 
if the corporate officers in the above example knew that there had 
been a problem at the facility with reducing the amount of lead in the 
sludge to permitted levels, and had not taken efforts to address it, a 
knowing violation might well be found. 
Moreover, the MPC makes special provision for dealing with in-
stances of "willful blindness. "175 Jurisdictions differ as to what can con-
stitute willful blindness. In some jurisdictions, the MPC's willful 
blindness proscription applies only if a person has "actual knowledge" 
or a "correct belief' of the harmful act. Thus, for example, if the cor-
porate officers in the above hypothetical noticed that sludge dis-
charges from their plant were colored or textured in a way typical of 
unpermitted lead discharges, they might be found to have personally 
observed its presence and therefore to have had "actual knowledge." 
Similarly, they might thus be said to have a "correct belief," even 
though they did not definitively know-or have had "actual knowl-
edge"-ofthe unpermitted discharge.I76 
A number of other jurisdictions also allow a finding of knowledge 
"if the person is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact 
in question, and he deliberately fails to investigate in order to avoid 
confirmation of the fact. "177 To again use the above hypothetical, will-
ful blindness under the MPC would exist so as to establish a "know-
ing" violation if a corporate officer noticed unusual sludge discharges 
and failed to ask pertinent questions, while knowing full well that lead 
is a health danger (this last claim is clearly one that would easily be 
established for anyone in the industry). 
174 See generally United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993). 
175 SeeDRESSLER, supra note 76, at 110. 
176 Cf. id. at 109-10. 
177 Id. at 110 (citing cases from the Fifth and Ninth federal circuits and from the Ne-
braska and North Carolina Supreme Courts); see also Eric A. Dubelier, Mens Rea Element in 
the Prosecution of Export Control Cases After Ratlaf v. United States, 733 PLljComm. 791, 817 
(Practicing Law Inst., Oct. 2,1995) (discussing Weitzenlwff, 1 F.3d at 1523). 
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Readers may be struck by the extent to which the CWA's "know-
ing" standard is very much like the one applied in the vast majority of 
criminal environmental prosecutions. That is, despite the Supreme 
Court's effort to apply the common law categories of "general" and 
"specific intent" in regulatory criminal prosecutions, as noted by 
Mandiberg,178 the lower courts, in fact, have applied a standard very 
much like that advocated in the MPC. Contrary to Lazarus' sugges-
tion,I79 then, rather than crafting an ultimately unworkable standard 
in regulatory crimes cases, the lower courts have struggled to apply 
federal criminal environmental standards according to a well-
established and manageable analytical protocol. 
A couple of examples make this clear. United States v. Boldt in-
volved the criminal prosecution of managers of a plant that used toxic 
metals to plate electronic circuit boards.I8o In Boldt, the defendant was 
charged with a knowing criminal violation of the CWA when he per-
mitted overflow from the company's "inadequate" wastewater pre-
treatment facilities to be discharged into the city sewer system.181 The 
overflow was completely untreated and contained toxic heavy metals. 
The defendant insisted that he was not directly responsible for the 
discharge. In a separate count, the defendant was charged with direct-
ing a subordinate to manually add a caustic chemical to a pretreat-
ment tank and, when this effort was unsuccessful, to dump a tankful 
of partially treated wastewater into the city sewer. With respect to 
these charges, the defendant intimated that he felt he had little alter-
native since the tanks were about to overflow and, in any case, that he 
was effectively prevented from stopping the discharge due to internal 
corporate pressures.182 
The court disagreed, sustaining the defendant's conviction. As 
for the defendant's tolerance of the direct discharge of untreated 
toxic wastes, the court found that "the evidence showed that [defen-
dant] was aware of the practice of bypassing the pollution control sys-
tem and had condoned it on the occasion at issue. "183 Regarding the 
second charge that the defendant had ordered a subordinate to dis-
charge partially treated toxic wastes, the court observed that "there is 
no dispute that [defendant] directly ordered his subordinate to dump 
178 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
1SO See grmerally 929 F.2d 35 (1 st Cir. 1991). 
181 See id. at 37. 
182 See id. at 38. 
183 fd. at 39. 
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the copper wastewater. "184 In other words, the court disagreed with 
the defendant's claims that any other alternative was impossible, or 
that his actions were necessary.185 
In the context of the argument advanced in this Article, what is 
especially striking about the Boldt analysis is the extent to which it ap-
plies the logic of the MPC for "knowing" criminal violations. In Boldt, 
the defendant clearly was "aware that it [was] practically certain that 
his conduct [would] cause" the result that led to his conviction, and 
so satisfied the first prong of the MPC's analysis of "knowing" 
crimes,186 In addition, the defendant was "aware that his conduct 
[was] of that nature or that such [attendant] circumstances exist," 
and therefore satisfied the awareness prong of the MPC's analysis,187 
Furthermore, under even the least generous of the willful blindness 
tests adopted pursuant to the MPC, the eponymous defendant in Boldt 
demonstrably had "actual knowledge" and a "correct belief" of the 
harmful act, even though he did not actually perform the act. In 
short, Boldt's culpability was appropriately established under the CWA 
using an MPC analysis. 
The same conclusion applies even where the facts are somewhat 
more problematic in terms of applying the MPC's "knowing" stan-
dard. In United States v. Brittain, the defendant, a city public utilities 
director, was found guilty at a jury trial of a criminal misdemeanor 
violation of the CWA.188 In particular, he was charged with tolerating 
discharges of raw sewage into a point source, and then directing a 
subordinate not to report this permit violation to the EPA, as required 
by the terms of the permit. Viewed in light of the MPC categories and 
a "knowing" violation analysis, the facts of Brittain are problematic 
only because the CWA then applied a ''willful'' or "negligent" standard 
in the criminal section that today applies a "knowing" standard.189 
Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that although the defendant was 
found guilty under a negligence standard, he would almost certainly 
be found guilty if a "knowing" standard had been applied. 
184 [d. 
185 See Boldt, 929 F.2d at 40. 
186 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (ii) (1980). 
187 [d. § 2.02(2) (b) (i). 
186 SeegmeraUy931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991). 
189 See id. at 1418; see also Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2454 (discuss-
ing the implications of a "willful" as opposed to a "knowing" environmental crime). But see 
Schiffer & Simon, supra note 103, at 2531, 2536 (questioning Lazarus's view). 
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This can be seen by looking at the facts leading to the defen-
dant's conviction. The defendant was told that raw sewage was being 
discharged from a permitted outfall, and "physically observed two 
such discharges. "190 As in Boldt, therefore, even though the defendant 
did not personally perform actions that led to the discharge, he was 
"aware that it [was] practically certain that his conduct [would] cause" 
the result that led to his conviction and, again as in Boldt, demon-
strated the awareness of the consequences of his conduct needed to 
establish a "knowing" CWA violation,191 The court further offered ob-
servations that left little doubt as to the defendant's "knowing" viola-
tion under the CWA's MPC-like analysis: 
[D]efendant had primary operational responsibility for the 
treatment plant .... Defendant was informed that such ille-
gal discharges were prone to occur during heavy rains and 
that he reviewed logs recording repeated illegal dis-
charges .... It appears from the plant supervisor's testimony 
that he discussed illegal discharges with defendant several 
times over a period of years and that the discharges were 
never reported.192 
Given such facts, it is unnecessary to perform a "willful blindness" 
analysis; the defendant's actions clearly satisfied the basic "knowing" 
violation elements. 
The advantage of applying these MPC standards in the case of 
federal environmental criminal prosecutions--instead of the common 
law "general" and "specific intent" standards--is that they provide 
greater intellectual clarity. They do so in two ways. First, they remove 
the judgment as to the degree of harm a person causes to the public 
welfare. Second, demonstration of some additional malicious intent is 
not required. 193 Thus, adoption of the MPC standards uses a more ob-
jective standard than does the common law of "general" and "specific 
intent." 
This distinction, in turn, would help resolve the central concern 
about environmental liability noted by the Weitzenhof! court, namely 
190 Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1418. 
191 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b)(ii). 
192 Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1420. 
m That is, the key questions asked to determine if a defendant had the requisite "spe-
cial" intent are removed. 
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the question of whether "knowingly" means a knowing violation of the 
law or simply knowing conduct that is violative of the law.194 
Ideally, to insure the continuing credibility of criminal prosecu-
tions under the CWA and similar federal environmental statutes, con-
gressional statutory amendment is desirable. Specifically, the "know-
ing" and "knowing endangerment" standards require explicit 
definition according to MPC standards. Thus, federal environmental 
statutes should clarify that in order to establish a "knowing" violation 
it is necessary either to demonstrate a defendant's certainty that a re-
sult will follow from actions or, at a minimum, satisfy the Code's con-
cept of "willful blindness." 
Alternately, statutory amendment might clarify the approach 
taken in United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc.195 In that case, the court 
concluded that a knowing environmental crime is one where defen-
dants knew that the activity in which they were engaged required a 
permit but that they failed to obtain one. In addition, however, the 
court added that while this approach required prosecutors to demon-
strate that all elements of the offense were "knowing," "the district 
court may also instruct the jury that such knowledge may be in-
ferred. "196 Such an approach is consistent with both the statutory lan-
guage and a MPC-influenced reading of the statute that dispenses 
with "general" and "specific intent"-like readings, and would empha-
size the need to know of an actual permit, thereby allowing for good 
faith errors. Thus, even in light of neurotoxicity-informed discharge 
standards, such an amendment would likely result in fewer prosecu-
tions. The possibility of inferring knowledge, however-if, for exam-
ple, a person's job responsibilities suggest that they should have 
known that an activity was permitted-would target real malefactors. 
This approach would put a greater burden on regulators than on the 
regulated by focusing on the permit itself rather than on the nature 
of the harm. 
194 See grnerally United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993). 
195 See generally 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984). AlthoughJohnson & Towers is a RCRA case, 
the similar structure of the "knowing" language means that this point applies with equal 
force to other federal environmental criminal provisions like that of the CWA. See generally 
id. 
196 Id. at 670. It seems likely that mere position in an organization is likely not enough 
to infer knowledge; rather, some amount of intent probably need be shown. See, e.g., United 
Statesv. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 40-56 (1st Cir. 1991); HARRIS ET 
AL., supra note 135, § 5.08. 
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B. Concerns About Statutory Reform 
This is not to suggest, however, that statutory amendments explic-
itly defining knowledge in terms of MPC standards would entirely re-
solve concerns about federal environmental criminal liability. While 
the more objective MPC standards represent an improvement over 
the common law criminal liability standards, they are far from perfect, 
since an inquiry into a defendant's awareness may result in some de-
gree of subjective assessment as to motive-sometimes based entirely 
on circumstantial evidence and inferences from that evidence. 
Nonetheless, the MPC standards unquestionably represent an 
improvement over the use of liability standards derived from the 
common law. Imagine, for instance, facts similar to those in Boldt or 
Brittain but involving releases of lead, cadmium, or manganese at lev-
els once classified as "sub-clinical" but, in light of evidence supporting 
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, were recently classified by the EPA as 
levels below which discharges are not permitted. Further imagine 
that, knowing of this recent reclassification but disagreeing with it, 
believing such reclassification to be an instance of unnecessary, over-
zealous regulation, a lead battery manufacturing plant supervisor al-
lowed discharge of toxic sludge into a point source at an unpermitted 
level. In that event, as Boldt and Brittain make clear, a criminal convic-
tion under section 1319 of the CWA would be appropriate. Moreover, 
as the above analysis suggests, such a conviction would accord with the 
MPC definitions for the CWA's statutory standards, although not with 
the common law regulatory protocol recently articulated by the Su-
preme Court. 
Finally, another alternative raised by the Neurotoxicity Hypothe-
sis is that criminal penalties for discharges should be reduced, pro-
vided that environmental statutes are correspondingly revised to in-
crease civil penalties. For instance, as indicated previously, neuro-
toxicity researchers posit that preventing neurotoxic contamination 
that may lead to violent criminal behavior may be relatively inexpen-
sive.l97 
CONCLUSION 
The above analysis confirms that further data validating the Neu-
rotoxicity Hypothesis is likely to result in increased convictions under 
the CWA and other federal environmental statutes, assuming revised 
197 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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discharge standards. Such convictions, importantly, will occur because 
it will be possible to satisfy the MPC-influenced mental state require-
ments contained in the CWA's principal criminal provision. Arguably, 
this is a fair result. On the one hand, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is 
likely to lead to a heightened degree of responsibility for industries 
that handle neurotoxic metals, at a risk of criminal prosecution. On 
the other hand, if such prosecutions proceed under federal statutes 
that clearly define "knowing" violations according to MPC mens rea 
standards, industries will not face the uncertain and highly subjective 
possibility of being classified as "public welfare" offenders. In the 
event that the volume of neurotoxicity-related prosecutions under the 
environmental statutes increases, violators could be forced to help pay 
for the costs of preventing future contamination by making significant 
contributions to nutrition and preventative medical programs, in ad-
dition to reducing discharges of toxic materials. 
To the extent that neurotoxicity data remains controversial, for 
the reasons outlined above,198 an increase in such prosecutions could 
well lead to increased calls from industries that use any of these toxic 
elements in their production to amend the CWA and other federal 
environmental criminal laws; industry'S demand surely would be to 
make it much more difficult to secure convictions. It can only be 
198 This is not to say that, even if federal environmental criminal liability standards are 
made less ambiguous, that no problems are likely to arise. This is likely to be especially 
true in instances in which convictions are sought despite the defendant's lack of knowl-
edge about having committed a legal violation. For example, in the above hypothetical, 
suppose that in light of increased contamination to a public waterway, the facility was or-
dered to cut its discharge of toxics<ontaminated waste in half. Suppose that, as in the case 
of California Public Interest Research Group v. Shell Oil Co., 840 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Cal. 1993) 
(which, it should be noted, involved only civil violations of the CWA), the EPA permit re-
vised the facility's discharge of combined lead and cadmium waste to ten pounds per day, 
such limits "intended to be a cap on current performance." Further assume that the facil-
ity admits that it was in violation of the ten pounds per day standard, but claims that it 
cannot be liable for a knowing violation unless both the numeric standard and the "narra-
tive" standard-meaning the language referring to the cap on current performance-are 
exceeded; This is because, the defendant facility maintains, the revised permit allows for 
liability "only if there is a change in its 'current performance' or operations." Id. at 716. 
Notwithstanding the lawyerly quality of such a contention, it is fair to observe that, even 
under MPC standards, a defendant might well have doubted whether she/he was in viola-
tion of a permit so long as ambiguity existed in the terms of the permit, and therefore 
would maintain that no "knowing" violation occurred, despite knowing that the discharged 
substances were of concern as possible health threats. A solution to such a concern may be 
more careful drafting of unambiguous permits. The facts of Shell Oil suggest that this will 
be especially important as the neurotoxicity hypothesis is further supported, in light of the 
probability that it will result in increased criminal environmental prosecutions, or at least 
the possibility of them. See id. 
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hoped, however, that as the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is more con-
vincingly supported with hard evidence, the need for the very real 
threat of criminal prosecution-or some comparable civil deterrent-
will continue to be recognized. The overwhelming social interest in 
maintaining the recent, celebrated declines in violent criminal behav-
ior should never be forgotten. l99 
The data undergirding the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis mounts 
every month, and therefore demands the attention of lawyers and 
policymakers. At the very least, it will present real challenges to those 
who continue to insist upon the importance of the notion of mens rea 
as a-if not the-fundamental tenet of our system of criminal justice. 
That is, if violent criminals can establish significant evidence of child-
hood neurotoxic contamination, they will have powerful affirmative 
defenses to any charges brought against them. This will certainly be 
true at the sentencing stage, if less so at the conviction stage. 
Similarly, the demonstrated link between neurotoxicity and crime 
likely will result in the increased conviction of those responsible for 
neurotoxic damage. This Article has outlined some of the ways in 
which this is so. It is hoped that the Article will also go some distance 
towards furthering the call for clarification of the liability standards 
contained in our nation's federal environmental laws. Failure to do so 
risks calling the fundamental integrity (and successful application) of 
those laws into serious question. 
199 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
